The crisis in
Darfur is an extension of the civil war between the mostly Arab populations of
the northern part of Sudan and the Southern Black Africans. The conflict
exploded in 1985 after a series of moves by the ruling elite of northern Sudan (the
Jellaba) to forcibly remove the inhabitants of the southern portion of the
country in order to annex their lands and expand the cash crop economy they had
created (Suliman, 1994). The government deeded large tracts of land to
absentee landlords, including wealthy merchants and politicians;
mechanized farming was implemented, funded in part by the World Bank,
displacing small agricultural and pastoral farmers (Sudan: Rich Farms,
Conflict and Climate Change, 2008). The displaced farmers, unable to sustain
themselves or their families, pushed back at these attempts to annex their
land. The first insurgency forces were the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA); they successfully fought the National Islamic Front (NIF), the party of
the ruling elite, and came to a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2004,
wherein the north and south would be ruled separately (Dagne & Everett,
2004). Darfur became the focus of a concentrated effort to rid the province of
its citizens and continue implementing the expansionary agenda in spite of the
CPA; it symbolizes the fundamental issue that impedes conflict resolution in
the area, namely, competition for dwindling resources in an already
impoverished region.
In February of
2003, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), along with the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM), two new insurgency groups, successfully challenged NIF
government forces in Darfur, one of the regions of Sudan primarily occupied by
Black Africans(The Darfur Emergency: Current Conflict and International
Response, 2004). In an effort to push back against this insurgency and control
the situation, Omar Bashir, the president of Sudan, gave the Janjaweed (Arab
militia) and the Popular Defense Force (PDF) permission to use extreme measures
to quell the rebellion and remove all non-Arabs from the region, including
forced expulsions from their homes, murder and “ethnic cleansing” (The Darfur
Emergency: Current Conflict and International Response, 2004). It has been
claimed that the crisis in Darfur was a distraction used to prevent the actual
implementation of the peace accord between the government of Sudan and the SLPM
(Dagne & Everett, 2004). The final comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was
signed in 2005, but Bashir has found a number of ways to sabotage it, including
sending troops to burn down whole villages in disputed territory and forcibly
expelling the inhabitants ( Dagne 2009).
The international
community and the African Union have attempted to put into practice solutions
to these issues, but have found their efforts deflected by an uncooperative
Sudanese government. The participants and attempted mechanisms of peace
include:
a.
The African
Union, consisting of a coalition of African states loosely modeled after the
EU, monitored the cease-fire agreement negotiated in Chad between the Sudanese
Government and the SLA/JEM. They helped create a “cease-fire commission” to
monitor violations and assist in the implementation. Rwandese and Nigerian
troops were to participate in the oversight, but were not required to protect
civilians (Dagne & Everett, 2004). Unfortunately, enforcement was marginal
and violations were not corrected, aside from reporting them to a Joint Commission
(Dagne & Everett, 2004). The AU troop level mandate was increased (from 300
to 3500 soldiers), but the government of Sudan would not grant them any form of
executive authority to protect civilians, so their role continued to be limited
in scope (Dagne & Everett, 2004).
b.
The United
Nations Human Rights Commission issued a “statement” condemning the ongoing
violence in Darfur, but would not do more due to fears that a too strongly
worded condemnation would alienate the Sudanese government and prevent access
to Darfur by UN representatives (Dagne & Everett, 2004). The obviously
obfuscating activities of the Sudanese government, trying to conceal atrocities
and protect the perpetrators, were noted, but Bashir was not confronted.(The
Darfur Emergency: Current Conflict and International Response, 2004). In 2007,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 to send 26,000 UN-AU troops to
Darfur as a peacekeeping force. In spite of its presence (weakened by a
reduced force), Sudan has continued its obstructionist behaviors, even
attacking a supply convoy in 2008 (Dagne 2009).
c.
The United
States initially called for a strongly worded statement from the United
Nations, but when that was defeated, asked that a special human rights
investigator be sent to Darfur(The Darfur Emergency: Current Conflict and
International Response, 2004). A special session of Congress was convened to
investigate the situation; the decision to impose sanctions was tempered by
concerns that naming the Janjaweed actors responsible for the atrocities would
exacerbate the situation(Dagne & Everett, 2004). There also was mention of
the fact that the U.S. was cooperating with some of the leaders of the
Janjaweed in counter-terrorism operations and that attacking them might
hamper these efforts(Dagne & Everett, 2004). USAID has provided money and
supplies for Darfur and sent disaster response teams to evaluate and assist in
providing relief to the homeless and refugees. In 2007, President Bush imposed
individual sanctions on Sudanese government officials, proposed expanding the
existing arms embargo, and institute financial sanctions (Dagne 2009).
President Obama has issued a new policy on Sudan that supports the
CPA, encourages and offers to support and monitor free elections, legal
reforms and a clear demarcation of the border (Smith, 2009)
d.
The
International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued a warrant for President Bashir’s
arrest as a war criminal. This was actually counter-productive for the people
of Darfur, inasmuch as Bashir retaliated by expelling 13 NGOs; it is thought he
might use this as another expedient for abandoning his commitment to the CPA (
Dagne 2009).
e.
The United
Nations, in 2007 passed resolution 1769, authorizing peacekeeping forces in
Darfur (UNAMID). The mission has run into opposition and even violence from the
Sudanese government (Darfur-Australia Network, 2010), but as of May 2010
had 21,816 uniformed personnel on the ground (African Union-United Nations
Hybrid Operations in Darfur, 2010).
f.
In January 2011,
South Sudan voted overwhelmingly to secede from North Sudan and form an
independent state.
The war in Sudan
is a regional problem and security implications for a number of neighboring
states, notably Rwanda, Chad, and the Central African Republic. Rwanda has sent
troops to support the African Union’s peacekeeping efforts (Dagne &
Everett, 2004). Chad has been destabilized by Sudanese government troops
together with Janjaweed crossing the border and raiding villages in retaliation
for suspected support to the SLA. Both Chad and the Central African Republic
have been fighting rebellions funded by Sudan ( Dagne 2009).
An analysis of
the leads to the conclusion that it is primarily based upon economic
factors. The ruling elite have controlled the economy to their own advantage; in
order to expand it and access the resources in the South, they resorted to
violence to attain their objectives. Ramsbotham, Woohouse & Miall (2005),
referencing work by Collier and the World Bank, describe “greed and
predation” (p. 140), as primary motives for civil war. Climate change has
brought prolonged drought and crop failure to many regions of Sudan, and as
large agribusinesses continue to expand their operations, the fragile detente
between the previously warring parties is perilously close to becoming unraveled
once more (Sudan: Rich Farms, Conflict and Climate Change, 2008). In
addition, oil revenues, which were to be split between the North and South, are
threatening to destabilize the delicate balance that has been created. The
Abyei region, with its rich oil reserves, straddles the border between the two
states; it was to have its own ‘referendum” to decide whether to join the North
or South (Zimeta, 2011). Recent developments reveal that both North and
South Sudan are concerned about military moves foreshadowing a precipitous land
grab to forestall the other from accessing and monopolizing the oil
fields (Zimeta, 2011). Because of what have been described as “poorly
defined property rights” (Zimeta, 2011) in Sudan and throughout Africa, it
is considerably easier for one group or another to seize occupied land and establish
a “legal claim” according to Western laws, giving them access to the resources
enjoyed by the previous occupants (Zimeta, 2011). Bashir has used a
“scorched earth” policy to do just that in Darfur, and it is feared that he
will resort to this tactic again in Abyei, in order to seize control of the
oil (Zimeta, 2011).
North and South
Sudan are locked in a stalemate at this time, each using zero sum thinking; as
Pruitt and Kim (2004) would explain, they have become “cognitively entrapped in
the conflict [and] committed to continue by...the need to justify prior
costs” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, p. 175). Although they did agree to a
referendum and appear to abide by the results, they are yet caught up in a
cycle of violence and potential aggression based upon access to resources,
whether they be agricultural land or oil revenues. Unequal distribution of
wealth, when carried to its extreme-- to the point that people are either
displaced from their homes and environment or are no longer able to survive
independently, fuels social conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall,
2005); in Sudan, the actions of the Jellaba started the insurgency against
them, and their relentless move to annex lands by force, prolonged and
broadened the conflict until it had engulfed the entire nation.
In conclusion,
the conflict in Sudan is rooted in economic issues. The Jellaba of North Sudan
began a policy of seizing land in the rich agricultural regions of southern
Sudan, to expand their agribusinesses. In addition, Sudan’s oil fields are
located in the southern area, making it a tempting target for appropriation as
well. Displacing hundreds of thousands of indigenous people, using ‘scorched
earth’ tactics and outright genocide, the Sudanese government resisted international
efforts to stop the violence until it was unable to effectively counter the
numerous insurgent groups fighting it and reluctantly signed a peace agreement.
The critical issues that impede conflict resolution at this time include
ongoing drought, which impedes their ability sustain themselves agriculturally,
an undeveloped infrastructure, preventing them from successfully marketing
their resources, influence from foreign companies whose sights are focused on
their oil fields, and who do not hesitate to pit one group against the
other (Zimeta, 2011), and the ongoing distrust and maneuvering for
advantage between the different factions. It is highly unlikely that these
obstacles will be overcome as long as the two nations are locked in stalemate
and have not resolved their fundamental issue, which is economic disparity.
Perhaps, with effective mediating, which will help them “identify, reframe and
sequence” the central issues of their dispute (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) and
create new alternatives (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) (such as cooperative
ventures to share oil revenues—an agreement they had reached but which was not
balanced and fair), both North and South Sudan will realize that it is to their
mutual advantage to join forces and use their many advantages to benefit every
citizen, as opposed to just a few at the top.
Works Cited
African Union-United Nations
Hybrid Operations in Darfur. (2010). Retrieved April 28, 2010, from UNAMID: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/
Dagne, T. (2009). Sudan:
The crisis in Darfur and the Status of the North-South Peace Agreement.
Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
Dagne, T., & Everett, B.
(2004). Sudan: The Darfur Crisis and the Status of the North-South
Negotiations. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
Darfur-Australia Network. (2010). Retrieved April 28,
2010, from http://www.darfuraustralia.org/darfur/background
Pruitt, D., & Kim, S. H.
(2004). Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. Boston:
McGraw Hill.
Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse,
T., & Miall, H. (2005). Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge:
Polity.
Smith, D. (2009, October 29).
Analyzing President Obama's New Sudan Policy. Retrieved April 28, 2011,
from International Affairs Review: http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/83
Sudan: Rich Farms, Conflict
and Climate Change.
(2008, May 22). Retrieved April 28, 2010, from Integrated Regional Information
Networks: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,45a5fb512,45a5fba52,4836929b26,0.html
Suliman, M. (1994). Civil
War in Sudan: The Impact of Ecological Degradation. Retrieved October 26,
2009, from University of Pennsylvania-African Studies center:
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/cvlw_env_sdn.html
The Darfur Emergency: Current
Conflict and International Response. (2004). International Debates ,
166-168.
Zimeta, M. (2011, March 31). After
Peaceful Vote, Oil Wealth Threatens to Return Sudan to Violence. Retrieved
April 28, 2011, from The Atlantic: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/after-peaceful-vote-oil-wealth-threatens-to-return-sudan-to-violence/73274/
No comments:
Post a Comment