Amy Chua: Globalization's incendiary effect on indigenous populations.

Many consider free market economies and globalization as synonymous with democratic governments and capitalism. Although there are correlations, they are not universal nor applicable to all nations which happen to play a part in the international market place. Furthermore, in many nations, only a small minority of the population is actively participating in what is termed ‘globalization”, while the rest languish in extreme poverty.  Amy Chua (2003), in her book World on Fire: How exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability, examines the manner in which these minority groups, often distinguished by their ethnicity, have successfully commandeered the resources of their host countries and the often tragic consequences of their monopolization. Chua (2003) enumerates a number of examples of minority exclusivity but is not completely successful in her attempt to find an indisputable causal correlation between “free market democracy” (Chua 2003) and the often violent social unrest that has plagued several of these countries.

Globalization has been defined as “the integration of states, through increasing contact, communication, and trade, to create a common global culture for all humanity” (Kegley Jr & Blanton, 2010). The current infatuation with globalization is largely based upon the perception that an internationally interdependent and free marketplace will eventually link and benefit all of humanity; this view optimistically assumes that being able to use the internet, or use technology that facilitates trade, travel and financial exchanges, somehow provides everyone with opportunities to participate in the international marketplace. Certainly, in the western and developed nations, this is largely true for most—the opportunity exists even if access to the technology is not always as easy as perceived. For those in the developing or least developed countries (LDC), though, this is not the case. Many nations struggle with serious governance issues, lack of infrastructure and instability; in a number of these, only a small minority of the population has the resources, education or position to become a member of what could be called the international economic community. Chua (2003) painstakingly details examples of this minority resource control,  then argues that, because these small groups have  acquired and hold  vast portions of their nation’s total wealth, they have become the targets of the hatred of the majority of citizens, as well as the underlying cause for the lack of economic progress of (Chua, 2003). She does not sidestep the issue of her own family’s ascendance to wealth in the Philippines, but instead uses this as a launching pad for a long list of inequities throughout the developing world.

In nation after nation, the author has found examples of ambitious, sometimes corrupt, and usually insular groups of immigrants who have penetrated an area, used its resources to create material wealth for themselves, and generally refused to integrate into the culture they used for personal enrichment. Beginning with Southeast Asia (Thailand, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines), Chua (2003) describes the manner in which the Chinese have largely taken over a number of industries and now dominate the host nations’ economies. At times using ruthless business tactics, they have managed to push the native populations to the brink of economic collapse while profiting at their expense (Chua, 2003). In addition, the ties they maintain with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan have given them innumerable links to the international market, so their ability to shift tactics and adapt with changing market conditions is enhanced beyond anything native competitors could conceive (Chua, 2003).

 Other examples include the Lebanese, Indians, Pakistani and Europeans in Africa, ethnic minorities in colonies now the beneficiaries of past preferential treatment by occupying colonial forces, Spanish and Portuguese descendents in Latin America, and the Jews in Russia (or, rather, a few Jews in Russia). It is difficult to argue with this abundance of evidence—those profiting at other’s expense are creating a volatile and explosive situation for themselves and their host countries, and it is likely that the situation will worsen before there is any hope of resolution. The difficulty Chua confronts is determining beyond what can be called a “reasonable” doubt that these conflicts are actually due to democratization, and the free market. Perhaps they are more correctly attributed to cultural, societal and “human” failures, such as a lack of ethical norms and an exaggerated sense of nationalistic superiority, resulting in the absence of any feeling  of accountability towards those who are essentially  providing them opportunities for personal enrichment.

After listing the numerous examples of corrupt exploitation occurring, the author describes the manner in which the attempted spread of democratization by the United States and other democratic governments has aggravated tensions in these fragile nations, and intensified ethnic conflict. Chua (2003) explains,

The global spread of democratization reflects the powerful assumption in Western policy and intellectual circles that markets and democracy go hand in hand. But, in numerous countries around the world with a market dominant minority, just the opposite has proved true. Adding democracy to markets has been a recipe for instability, upheaval, and ethnic conflagration. (Chua, 2003, 124).

            Conflating democracy with social unrest and ethnic conflict is a difficult maneuver, as prevailing theories associate free elections and populist governments with stability  and prosperity.  How and why these are associated is still open to debate, however; as Gabriel Almond, Bingham Powell et al (2006) point out, the relationship between democracy, prosperity and stability is far from unambiguous (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2006, 39). The fact that democratic institutions introduced into poor, uneducated societies are often replaced by dictatorships is unarguable, but the contributory elements are still unknown (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2006). Chua is attempting to establish this causal correlation; her proposition argues that democratization in poor countries “increases the political voice and power of the frustrated majority” (Chua, 2003,124), who then are seduced by the scapegoating tactics of demagogues and pulled into violence by this combination of circumstances (Chua, 2003). These factors result in three basic forms of “backlashes,” (Chua, 2003, 125),namely against free markets and democracy, and for ethnic cleansing, genocide and other atrocities (Chua, 2003).

            The first backlash listed is against free markets; Chua lists a number of examples where newly elected governments have targeted the ultra wealthy and nationalized much of their property—especially banks and extractive industries such as oil and diamonds. It is difficult to argue that these socialist approaches have been popular with the poor and (until then) disenfranchised , who have witnessed an obscene accumulation of wealth by some accompanied by the reduction of their own ability to eke out a minimal living.  These wealthy elite , who have managed to sequestrate much of the nation’s income, are generally tied into world markets and have succeeded in creating  business environments for themselves that preclude regulatory reforms unfavorable to their ongoing monopolies (Chua, 2003). Thus free markets and globalization, which have not benefited the poor, are not viewed with much affection by these last groups and are generally considered to be a form of imperialism by wealthy capitalist nations (Chua, 2003).

            The next counterattack, according to Chua, is against democracy itself. Usually due to a self-serving symbiotic (“crony capitalism” (Chua, 2003, 147) relationship  between a nation’s  leader and the wealthy elite which distorts the wealth disparity even more, this backlash leads to rebellion and eventual civil war. In Africa especially, the violence and sheer brutality of these rebellions has shocked the world; Chua rightly points out that in cases such as Sierra Leone, the responsibility for the bloodshed lies not only in the hands of these corrupt individuals, but also in those of such institutions as the IMF, which uses an often inapt template of conditions for its aid packages (Chua, 2003), (Stiglitz, 2000) and global markets focused on profits irregardless of the consequences to the citizens of these nations (Chua, 2003).

            Finally, Chua posits that the most gruesome backlash caused by the above mentioned inequities has been one of mindless ethnic cleansing and genocidal mania against the “hated minorities” (Chua, 2003). Here, the author is careful to point out that many genocidal events have complex histories and cannot be assigned purely to economics; she does, however, attempt to link a strong correlation between the “wildly disparate wealth” (Chua, 2003) of the minority elite, the ongoing humilation and increasing poverty of the majority and the lynch mob frenzies that infect the oppressed, leading them to commit horrifying acts of vicious cruelty against these ethnic minorities.

            Because xenophobia, nationalism and insularity are such widespread phenomena with deep historical roots, it is difficult to determine if their extreme manifestations in the modern day world are due to globalism and the spread of free market democracies, or simply a continuation of ongoing unresolved social development issues—including an absence of universal normative standards of behavior (namely, ethics). If one were to use the basic premises of Realist thought versus Liberal as a lense through which to view the situation, it becomes quickly obvious that most people around the world, especially the uneducated whose cultural traditions have changed little over the centuries, function as  “Realists.”  By definition, the ‘Realist” view includes the assumptions that people are narrowly selfish and ethically flawed by nature and cannot change, that they have an instinctive lust for power and to dominate others, that it is “utopian” to try and change human nature, and that personal profit regardless of the consequences to others is a driving force of the human psyche (Kegley Jr & Blanton, 2010). Liberals, on the other hand, see cooperation and mutuality as more logical approaches (Kegley Jr & Blanton, 2010); redistribution of wealth to modify the effects of capitalism (Chua, 2003) is a good example of liberal thought. It seems evident that social evolution (or the lack thereof) is responsible for the behavior of the etnic minorities Chua describes; their conduct is typical in a cultural environment that applauds zero-sum approaches to life and would be replicated by the majority ethnic groups had they the resources, education and connections to do so successfully.

            The argument that globalization is at the root of social unrest has a number of critics, including Mats Berdal (2003) who argues that although some may see a “relatively clear cut and unambiguous causal connection between economic globalization, socioeconomic dislocation, and the outbreak of violence” (Berdal, 2003), there is a more likely explanation which, using the same basic factors, recombines them and produces an argument which states that “contemporary wars tie into and are sustained by global processes, and, in particular, (that) the mechanisms of a more open and deregulated international economy have enabled belligerents not only to maintain but to develop a vested economic interest in a continued conflict” (Berdal, 2003). Berdal contends that the ‘where, when and how” the stresses of globalization ( extremes in wealth distribution etc) become ‘transmuted into armed violence on a societal scale” (Berdal, 2003) have not been determined with any real accuracy, and that it is premature to draw any conclusions based on the apparent rise in ethnic conflict worldwide. He endorses William Reno’s (2000) explanation that in such places as Africa, conflict is an “instrument of enterprise as a mode of accumulation”( cited in Berdal, 2003) and that those who profit from it are ‘wielding violence as the main instrument of their economic activity” (Berdal, 2003). Hence, rather than an ethnic uprising in protest of manipulation by the elite, the conflict itself is a manipulation of the majority by those who would usurp the power held by these elite. Berdal concludes that it is difficult to prove underlying patterns in diverse cases of intrastate conflict, that understanding the political economy of civil war per se is critical, as well as individualizing the various stories by recognizing the unique characteristics of each situation including the socioeconomic history, geographical fault lines, urban/rural divisions, colonial influences (if any) and ethnic tensions (Berdal, 2003).

            World on Fire (2003) appears to take on a Marxist approach that blames capitalism for the instability in developing nations; free trade then becomes a “source for increasing the political power of the strong over the weak” (Gilpin, 1987). Allowing free market forces to interplay without interference can enhance disparities and give opportunities for exploitation that would not exist in a regulated environment. Individual societies, however, must be accountable for their own development and governance;   political cultures are shaped by the perceptions and assumptions of the citizens as well as their historical traditions and preferences. The desire for equal participation and autonomy  that democratization offers has been a catalyst for change in traditionally conservative nations; voicing discontent about perceived injustice or economic inequity has been taken to new dimensions with the advent of instant communication and the rising awareness of how the rest of the global community functions. Participation patterns, as explained by Almond, Powell et al (2006) are influenced by the ability for citizens to articulate their interests legitimately; if their access to government is restricted, they will resort to coercive channels (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2006), as evidenced in many of the examples Chua lists.  In many developing countries, “electoral authoritarianism” (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2006) has been growing because the ruling elite are increasingly feeling their positions and wealth as threatened by the demands of the electorate. It can be argued that democratization is, in the long run, a positive development even though the change to populism is convulsive and resulting in a violent redress of historical injustices and exploitation.

         Chua (2003) has taken a strongly critical position in the debate about the value of globalization and its effects on societies worldwide. Although economists such as Thomas Friedman(2005)  and Jagdish Bhagwati (2002) defend globalization as holding the ultimate solutions to world poverty, others would argue that its liabilities are for the time being beginning to overwhelm its assets. Friedman(2005) sees “global supply chains” as the solution to interstate conflict and the internet as providing the beginning of international collaboration for universal welfare. Bhagwati counters the notion that globalization has negative social effects by eulogizing the “equal opportunity” outcome that some multinational corporations have had in some instances and dismisses all other arguments as specious (Bhagwati, 2002). He acknowledges that some inequity still exists (wages, child labor, sweatshops) and feels that financial incentives can alleviate these as employers seek to attract and / or retain business in a competitive environment. As he explains: “ Corporations should be defended against ignorant, ideological, or strategic assaults...social good is multidimensional, and different corporations must define social responsibility, quite legitimately, in different ways in a global economy...” (Bhagwati, 2002). Others, including Chua, disagree with this stance.

            The rapidly increasing income disparity globalization has aggravated is a contentious subject; while no-one wants to see poverty, hunger, civil strife and bloodshed rise worldwide, no-one wants to arrest the globalist trend and its promise of potential wealth and integration either. Paul Collier (2007) sees the wealthy nation’s insistence upon using competitive trade policies with emerging economies as ultimately self defeating as it contributes to the growing inability of these fragile nations to achieve any degree of parity, even in those areas of economic development where they ostensibly have some advantage (Collier, 2007). In addition, Collier clearly sees that the struggle in developing nations is between those who  need change to occur just to survive (in this case, as Chua notes, the majority of the population of most LDCs), and those who want to maintain the status quo at all costs (Collier, 2007). As he states rather bluntly,” the politics of the bottom billion is not the bland and sedate process of the rich democracies but rather a dangerous contest between moral extremes” (Collier, 2007)—a statement Chua would agree with.

            Dani Rodrik (2002) feels that the new focus must be on improving the state of the poorest nations, or the dream of becoming a global economic community is doomed (Rodrik, 2002). One of the key issues Rodrik sees is the blinders economists have when it comes to an honest evaluation of the effects free trade have upon developing nations. Citing China and India as success stories, they fail to realistically assess the impact of the “rising inequality, enormous volatility and economic growth rates significantly below those of the Post WW II decades” (Rodrik, 2002) in Latin America and other developing regions. Rodrik  would like to see new policies allowing labor to migrate where jobs are opening up , including a relaxing of work permit regulations and international cooperation to facilitate this labor mobility (Rodrik, 2002).

            Addressing the international community’s implicit support of tyrannical African regimes and oppressive economic policies favoring the few, Robert Calderisi (2006) feels that open military intervention in support of the oppressed is necessary to stabilize fragile countries.  In addition, he favors “barring western arm sales to unrepresentative governments, quarantining any state that imprisons journalists for expressing personal opinions, abolishing laws that make it a crime to criticize African presidents..and seizing illicit African holdings in western banks...” (Calderisi, 2006) as actions which would demonstrate to the people of Africa that change is possible and would be supported by the world at large.

            World on Fire (2003) is a serious discussion of issues that need to be addressed by humanity as a whole: the majority ethnic populations who have waited until a situation is untenable and then used violence to change it, minorities who exploit others and use a form of social Darwinism to justify their ill gained wealth and continued stranglehold on the economies of the nations they inhabit, western style free market and “democracy at any cost” enthusiasts, multinational corporations obsessed with profit, workers in developed nations indifferent to the plight of others and unwilling to change so as to accommodate the needs of the poorest among them...the list goes on. As Chua notes, western nations have had centuries to develop and refine their democracies; these are complex institutions that transcend the basic premise of ‘one man, one vote.” While enfranchising the citizens of any nation is laudable, the process has to be logical, not a simple imposition of free elections. Each culture must have the autonomy to approach the process as suits them best. Justice—or the absence of such--Chua posits, is at the root of the problems confronting unstable nations. When a people perceive injustice, when they are oppressed and humiliated, exploited and demeaned, they reach a certain tolerance level before exploding. The crises confronting many nations is, as Chua describes, due to the aggravation of an insidious problem that has its roots in history. Extremes of wealth and poverty are not as easily tolerated as they once were, when even the poor had the ability to feed their families and eke out a living.

            In conclusion,  although Chua(2003) may not have clearly and unambiguously made the connection between the democratic institutions being introduced into these nations, and the violence that has plagued them, she does create the setting to critically examine the process by which undeveloped nations are being introduced to the global market and the inequity existing in them. For far too long, wealthy nations have attempted to ignore the consequences of their imperialist reach, their ongoing fixation on profits at any cost, and their attempts at achieving hegemonic homogeneity—with their cultural and customs as the “standard.” It is time for some humility, some accountability, some willingness to admit that serious errors have been committed, and that redress will have to be a universal effort—with the affected populations directing how and when it occurs. Until then, the crises will continue and will worsen. It remains to be seen whether Chua’s(2003) warning will be heeded in time.

                                                            References

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