Jus Ad Bellum--Just War Theory

In view of the new war looming on our horizon, which will be to supposedly "prevent" Iran from developing nuclear weapons,and our new policy of preemptive action against anyone (including American citizens) whom we feel might at some time decide to attack, I felt it appropriate to publish an analysis of the Iraq war I wrote last year, which concluded that it did not begin to meet the criteria of a Just War. Perhaps this can be a reminder to American citizens that they are entitled to demand a less bellicose approach to international affairs than we have used in the last decade.

                                                        Jus Ad Bellum

“War is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will”-- Carl Von Clausewitz (1832).           

“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” –Chapter I, Article 2, (4) Charter of the United Nations.

            “Jus ad bellum” (Just War) is a theoretical set of constructs that propose to determine whether a projected conflict can be justified legally and morally.  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lists six basic criteria: the war must have a just cause, be fought with the right intentions, can only be initiated by the right authorities, should have some degree of probability of success, and be proportional to the provocation (Orend, 2005). Although these appear to be straight forward, the truth is that interpretations and ambiguities abound in each and every one, making a definite analysis of a conflict according to “Jus ad bellum” difficult. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was supposedly a defensive move against a country with known ties to the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attack, a large arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, and plans to use these to establish a hegemonic presence in the Middle East, thus threatening our national security. This paper will examine the justifications for Operation Iraqi Freedom through the lenses of ‘Just cause,” “Right Intentions” and “Proportionality” to demonstrate that it did not meet the criteria of Jus ad bellum...

            Just Cause

“Just Cause” norms include self defense against outside aggression, defending others from unjustified attacks, protecting the defenseless, and punishment for wrongdoings by one group against another (Orend, 2005). The stated objectives for Operation Iraqi freedom were to

“End the regime of Saddam Hussein, identify, isolate and eliminate, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, to search for, capture and drive out terrorists from the country, collect intelligence related to terrorist networks, collect such intelligence as is related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction, end sanctions and  immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and needy citizens, secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people and finally, help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government.” (Pike, 2005) (editing mine).

The premises upon which some of these ends are based are somewhat dubious. Although Hussein had, over the years (since before the Iran-Iraq war), possessed  biological and chemical weapons and had made some progress in developing a nuclear program,  inspection teams from the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMVOIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IEEA) combed Iraq from November 2002 to March 2003 and failed to uncover any nuclear arsenal as claimed to exist by the United States (Squassoni, 2003). The links between Al-Qaeda (perpetrators of the 9/11 attack) and Iraq were tenuous and posed no immediate threat to the United States (as opposed to the known presence of Bin Laden in Afghanistan) (Schmitt, 2004 ). The goals of ending the sanctions leveraged by the Security Council in 1990 (Sanctions Against Iraq, 2005) seems laudable except for the fact that the United States repeatedly blocked their removal until after the invasion of 2003 (Sanctions Against Iraq, 2005). It seems evident that based on even a cursory review, the invasion of Iraq did not meet the basic premises of being a just cause; there was no immediate threat to the United States and was not aimed at defending a helpless people against attack.

Right Intentions

This criterion states that  the war must be fought for just causes only and not be motivated by any hidden agendas such as resource acquisition or contol (Orend, 2005). This particular issue has become contentious as far as the invasion of Iraq is concerned, as there has  been ongoing speculation about the United States using this attack to position itself as the hegemon in the Middle east and thus pre-empt any attempts to control the oil industry there. The fact that Allan Greenspan stated quite openly in his book that the Iraq war is “largely about oil” (as cited in Weissman, 2007) and that removing Hussein was a move to keep oil production in friendly hands (Weissman, 2007) have confirmed some of these doubts. Forcible regime change as a result of legal military action is considered acceptable (Schmitt, 2004 ) but premeditated regime change is not. There is evidence that members of the Bush administration had conceived plans to overthow Hussein as far back as 1998, when they openly petitioned President Clinton to invade Iraq and depose its leader (Abrams, Armitage, Bennett, & al, 1998). Although these issues might be considered tenuous in some circles, they do indicate a failure to meet the “Right Intentions” clause of a just war.

Proportionality

            The question in this area is whether or not  the bombing,  invasion and occupation of Iraq were proportionate responses to the perceived danger. Although seemingly almost impossible to tally correctly,there is consensus that the civilian casualties in Iraq  since the beginning of the war number in the tens of thousands dead and wounded (Fischer, 2005). The infrastructure of the country was severely damaged and has not yet recovered fully, while the social fabric has been rent opening the way for explosive ethnic and religious conflicts. If the stated purpose of the invasion was to save the people of Iraq from their oppressor and eliminate the threat of the use of WMDs, it would seem that they have paid a heavy price for their (unasked for) liberation.  Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom fail the proportionality condition of a just war.

  James Dunnigan and William Martel (1987), state that there are four basic causes of war: Long Standing Grievances, Internal Disorder, Sense of Military Superiority, and the Fear of Being Attacked (Dunnigan & Martel, 1987).  The United States, with its newly worded National Security Strategy document of 2002 (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html), seems to have added “anticipatory attacks” to the list. Charles Kegley and Shannon Blanton (2010) question the validity of pre-emptive attacks, based on an imminent, credible threat, versus “preventive” attacks, based upon the fear that one might occur at some time in the future.  It appears that the first can be considered legitimate under the just war definition, whereas the second does not. Preventive warfare legitimizes paranoia, violence as mediator and lowers accountability standards. This was the primary difficulty with the rationalizations surrounding the invasion and occupation of Iraq: they tried to justify a preventive war while ignoring international opinion which expected adherence to the principles of a just war.

Works Cited

Abrams, E., Armitage, R., Bennett, W., & al, e. (1998, January 26). Letter to President Clinton. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from project for the New American Century: http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm

Carl von Clausewtiz.s Definitions of War. (2010, Feb 5). Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Clausewtiz.com: http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/grimsley1/h380/on_war.htm

Dunnigan, J., & Martel, W. (1987). How to Stop a war: Lessons of Two Hundred Years of War and Peace. New York: Doubleday.

Fischer, H. (2005, April 6). U.S. Military and Iraqi Casualty Statistics:Additional Numbers and Explanations. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from CRS Report for Congress: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22126.pdf

Orend, B. (2005, July 28). War. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/#2.1

Pike, J. (2005, April 27). Operation Iraqi Freedom. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Global Security.org: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom.htm

Sanctions Against Iraq. (2005). Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Global Policy Forum: http://www.globalpolicy.org/iraq/previous-issues-and-debate-on-iraq/sanctions-against-iraq.html

Schmitt, R. (2004 ). The Legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom under International Law. Journal of Military Ethics , 82-104.

Squassoni, S. (2003, October 7). Iraq: UN Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from CRS Report for Congress: http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31671.pdf

Weissman, R. (2007, September 17). Greenspan, Kissinger. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Global Policy.org: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/40691.html