Some thoughts on Islamic Traditions

The word “tradition” is generally used to describe a set of values or customs that is passed on for a number of generations, and honored specifically because of its endurance. In Islam, the term is used ubiquitously and appears to have several meanings, including a movement based on a return to pure Islamic values, such as Wahhabism (Lewis 2004, 120) or “authoritarian and quietist” versus “radical and activist” traditions (Lewis 2004, 10). An alternate meaning refers to the “sayings and acts attributed to Muhammad and transmitted orally” (Webster's New World College Dictionary 2002, 1517). After Muhammad’s death, a number of stories, or traditions (hadith) ascribed to the prophet were compiled and used to interpret his intent, so as to guide the Muslim community in understanding  his standards and expectations (Berkey 2003, 116). As time passed, these traditions have taken on a life of their own, in that their meanings, reliability and relative strength or weakness have been the focus of ongoing debate and study. Just as “Islamic Traditions” as a term has different connotations, the hadith are stratified according to their authenticity and content, adding incredible complexity to the issue. As it appears impossible to establish any truly stringent guidelines for their legitimacy and reliability, it would seem that basing a movement upon the guidance of hadith would be a dubious venture based more on faith than scriptural authenticity.

Hadith have generally been categorized as belonging to one of at least four categories:  Sahih (sound), Hasan (good), Da’if (weak), or Maudu’ (fabrications) (An Introduction to the Science of Hadith 2010).  The Sahih hadith are considered authoritative in that they came from trustworthy sources; Hasan hadith have some reliability issues, perhaps due to being second hand stories, but their sources are yet considered dependable (An Introduction to the Science of Hadith 2010). The last two categories are reserved for those traditions whose veracity is in doubt, due to several factors including “political differences, factions based on issues of creed...fabrications by story-tellers or ignorant ascetics, prejudice in favor of a particular imam, personal motives or proverbs turned into hadiths...” (An Introduction to the Science of Hadith 2010). The task of reviewing and certifying the reliability of hadith, as well as publishing the collections of those considered Shahih or Hasan, has been the focus of  scholars since the 9^th century (Berkey 2003).

Content criticism of the hadith as an early scholarly discipline has been a source of speculation. Western scholars had assumed that early studies were focused on their genealogy with little attention paid to the content, and that the innate faith of the Muslim was such that they were more intent on preserving the linearity of transmission than in critically examining the substance within (Brown 2008). There is a growing belief however that early hadith scholars did indeed analyze content and reject those which did not agree with predetermined criteria including whether or not the report contradicted the Qu’ran, established sunna or the “verdict of reason,” that is, whether or not an event could have occurred historically (Brown 2008, 152).  In his  review of  Mohammad Kamali’s work A Textbook of Hadith Studies: Authenticity, Compilation, Classification and Criticism of Hadith (2005), Gavin Picken (2006) comments that although the noted scholar feels that the study and review of hadith has indeed been completed over the centuries and is now redundant, there are “neo-traditionalists” who would revive this practice inasmuch as they feel that pure knowledge can only be achieved in this “classical way” (Picken 2006, 132). This idea is similar to that of  many evangelical Christians, who insist that a literal interpretation of the Bible is the only way to achieve a true understanding of God’s intent.

It appears that “Islamic Traditions” is a fluid term with a number of connotations; it evolves and mutates depending upon the person or group using it and cannot be firmly attributed to any one specific item, agenda or story. Those movements that wish to return to what they deem to be ‘pure” Islam are constricted by the indeterminate source of the hadith they use as foundational principles. If however they rely upon the determination of their Imam, they are taking a leap of faith that he indeed is an infallible source. Either way, there does not appear to be any firmly rooted absolutism in the minds of the scholars; the community itself, however, not having the background of the  ulama, has to rely upon them for interpretation and verification of authenticity. That also can be seen as a leap of faith.

 

"An Introduction to the Science of Hadith." Islamic Awareness. October 2010. http://www.islamic-awareness.org/Hadith/Ulum/asb7.html (accessed October 21, 2010).

Berkey, Jonathan. The Formation of Islam. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Brown, Jonathan. "How We Know early Hadith Critics Did Matn Criticism and Why It's So Hard to Find." Islamic Law and Society 15, 2008: 143-184.

Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam. New York: Random House, 2004.

Picken, Gavin. Review of “A Textbook of Hadith Studies by Mohammad Kamali." Journal of Qu'ranic Studies, Vol. 8 No 6, 2006: 131-38.

Webster's New World College Dictionary. Cleveland: Wiley Publishing Inc., 2002.

Depriving citizens of their vote: New maneuvers, old strategy

The right to vote is a normative founding principle of a democracy; it is implicitly understood that government by the people entails public participation in the policy making process. Voter turnout fluctuates the United States, but has been averaged to 52%, much lower than most European democracies (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2006). The reason for this low turnout has been debated; some have posited that the percentage is based on census numbers of people of voting age, without consideration for the number of illegal immigrants or convicted felons, who are disenfranchised in many states (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2006). Recent developments might curtail this number even more, as states deliberately seek ways to eliminate voters from the rolls and skew election results by depriving certain groups of their vote. This reminds us of the early 20^th century, when women fought to get the vote, and were pushed back by those who did not want their monopoly on power threatened.

Some of the measures being implemented with the direct intent of disenfranchising voters include restricting early voting and absentee ballots, in order to force voters to show up at the polls in person and present a photo ID. One example of this is HB 194 of Ohio, which would disallow counties from mailing absentee ballots to residents, halve the number of days allowable for early voting, and eliminates online registration (Voting Rights, 2011).

A number of states have passed photo ID laws, most of which will take effect before the 2012 elections (Voter Identification Requirements, 2012). “Strict” photo ID states require voters to present a photo ID when they come to vote; if they do not have one with them, they can use a ‘provisional” ballot that is invalidated if they do not return within a set number of days with the acceptable identification. Other photo ID states allow the person to vote if he or she can prove in some other way that they are who they claim to be (such as signing an affidavit) (Voter Identification Requirements, 2012). A number of the strict photo ID laws have been challenged in court because they appear to target the poor, students and minority populations, all of whom are more likely to not have acceptable forms of photo ID (Voter Identification Requirements, 2012).

These attempted legal restrictions on voter’s rights have been implemented in most “battleground” states, where preventing large demographics from voting could determine the presidential election (Dade, 2012). The purported reason for these tactics is to “reduce voter fraud” (Dade, 2012), which, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, is very rare; because it can disenfranchise up to 10% of eligible voters, it should be carefully evaluated before implemented as a ‘remedy” for a non-existent threat ( Policy Brief on the Truth About “Voter Fraud”, 2006).

While the Constitution of the United States does not guarantee the right to vote, it does emphasize that no state shall deprive a citizen of their voting rights. The normative principle of a democracy upon which the Constitution rests is centered on the concepts of populism, self determination and government by the people. Infringing upon these is a violation of this principle and a very real threat to the legitimacy of future elections, and of the resulting governments.


Sources:

Policy Brief on the Truth About “Voter Fraud”. (2006). Retrieved from The Brennan Cneter for Justice: http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/policy_brief_on_the_truth_about_voter_fraud/

Almond, G., Powell, B., Dalton, R., & Strom, K. (2006). Comparative Politics Today. New York: Longman.

Dade, C. (2012, January 12). Political Battle Brewing Over New Voter ID Laws. Retrieved January 24, 2012, from NPR: http://www.npr.org/2012/01/11/145044060/political-battle-brewing-over-new-voter-id-laws

Voter Identification Requirements. (2012, January 9). Retrieved from National Conference of State Legislatures: http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections-campaigns/voter-id-state-requirements.aspx

Voting Rights. (2011, December 19). Retrieved January 23, 2012, from ACLU: http://www.acluohio.org/issues/votingrights/

Sudan: How the 1% contribute to state failure.

The crisis in Darfur is an extension of the civil war between the mostly Arab populations of the northern part of Sudan and the Southern Black Africans. The conflict exploded in 1985 after a series of moves by the ruling elite of northern Sudan (the Jellaba) to forcibly remove the inhabitants of the southern portion of the country in order to annex their lands and expand the cash crop economy they had created (Suliman, 1994).  The government deeded large tracts of land to absentee landlords,  including wealthy merchants and politicians; mechanized farming was implemented, funded in part by the World Bank, displacing small agricultural and pastoral farmers (Sudan: Rich Farms, Conflict and Climate Change, 2008). The displaced farmers, unable to sustain themselves or their families, pushed back at these attempts to annex their land.  The first insurgency forces were the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA); they successfully fought the National Islamic Front (NIF), the party of the ruling elite, and came to a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2004, wherein the north and south would be ruled separately (Dagne & Everett, 2004). Darfur became the focus of a concentrated effort to rid the province of its citizens and continue implementing the expansionary agenda in spite of the CPA; it symbolizes the fundamental issue that impedes conflict resolution in the area, namely, competition for dwindling resources in an already impoverished region.

In February of 2003, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), along with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), two new insurgency groups, successfully challenged NIF government forces in Darfur, one of the regions of Sudan primarily occupied by Black Africans(The Darfur Emergency: Current Conflict and International Response, 2004). In an effort to push back against this insurgency and control the situation, Omar Bashir, the president of Sudan, gave the Janjaweed (Arab militia) and the Popular Defense Force (PDF) permission to use extreme measures to quell the rebellion and remove all non-Arabs from the region, including forced expulsions from their homes, murder and “ethnic cleansing” (The Darfur Emergency: Current Conflict and International Response, 2004). It has been claimed that the crisis in Darfur was a distraction used to prevent the actual implementation of the peace accord between the government of Sudan and the SLPM (Dagne & Everett, 2004). The final comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, but Bashir has found a number of ways to sabotage it, including sending troops to burn down whole villages in disputed territory and forcibly expelling the inhabitants ( Dagne 2009).

The international community and the African Union have attempted to put into practice solutions to these issues, but have found their efforts deflected by an uncooperative Sudanese government. The participants and attempted mechanisms of peace include:

a.                          The African Union, consisting of a coalition of African states loosely modeled after the EU, monitored the cease-fire agreement negotiated in Chad between the Sudanese Government and the SLA/JEM. They helped create a “cease-fire commission” to monitor violations and assist in the implementation. Rwandese and Nigerian troops were to participate in the oversight, but were not required to protect civilians (Dagne & Everett, 2004). Unfortunately, enforcement was marginal and violations were not corrected, aside from reporting them to a Joint Commission (Dagne & Everett, 2004). The AU troop level mandate was increased (from 300 to 3500 soldiers), but the government of Sudan would not grant them any form of executive authority to protect civilians, so their role continued to be limited in scope (Dagne & Everett, 2004).

b.                         The United Nations Human Rights Commission issued a “statement” condemning the ongoing violence in Darfur, but would not do more due to fears that a too strongly worded condemnation would alienate the Sudanese government and prevent access to Darfur by UN representatives (Dagne & Everett, 2004). The obviously obfuscating activities of the Sudanese government, trying to conceal atrocities and protect the perpetrators, were noted, but Bashir was not confronted.(The Darfur Emergency: Current Conflict and International Response, 2004). In 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 to send 26,000 UN-AU troops to Darfur as a peacekeeping force. In spite of its presence (weakened by a reduced force), Sudan has continued its obstructionist behaviors, even attacking a supply convoy in 2008 (Dagne 2009).

c.                          The United States initially called for a strongly worded statement from the United Nations, but when that was defeated, asked that a special human rights investigator be sent to Darfur(The Darfur Emergency: Current Conflict and International Response, 2004). A special session of Congress was convened to investigate the situation; the decision to impose sanctions was tempered by concerns that naming the Janjaweed actors responsible for the atrocities would exacerbate the situation(Dagne & Everett, 2004). There also was mention of the fact that the U.S. was cooperating with some of the leaders of the Janjaweed in counter-terrorism operations and that  attacking them might hamper these efforts(Dagne & Everett, 2004). USAID has provided money and supplies for Darfur and sent disaster response teams to evaluate and assist in providing relief to the homeless and refugees. In 2007, President Bush imposed individual sanctions on Sudanese government officials, proposed expanding the existing arms embargo, and institute financial sanctions (Dagne 2009). President Obama has issued a new policy on Sudan that supports the CPA, encourages and offers to support and monitor free elections, legal reforms and a clear demarcation of the border (Smith, 2009)

d.                         The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued a warrant for President Bashir’s arrest as a war criminal. This was actually counter-productive for the people of Darfur, inasmuch as Bashir retaliated by expelling 13 NGOs; it is thought he might use this as another expedient for abandoning his commitment to the CPA ( Dagne 2009).

e.                          The United Nations, in 2007 passed resolution 1769, authorizing peacekeeping forces in Darfur (UNAMID). The mission has run into opposition and even violence from the Sudanese government (Darfur-Australia Network, 2010), but as of May 2010 had 21,816 uniformed personnel on the ground (African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operations in Darfur, 2010).

f.                          In January 2011, South Sudan voted overwhelmingly to secede from North Sudan and form an independent state.

The war in Sudan is a regional problem and security implications for a number of neighboring states, notably Rwanda, Chad, and the Central African Republic. Rwanda has sent troops to support the African Union’s peacekeeping efforts (Dagne & Everett, 2004). Chad has been destabilized by Sudanese government troops together with Janjaweed crossing the border and raiding villages in retaliation for suspected support to the SLA. Both Chad and the Central African Republic have been fighting rebellions funded by Sudan ( Dagne 2009).

An analysis of the   leads to the conclusion that it is primarily based upon economic factors. The ruling elite have controlled the economy to their own advantage; in order to expand it and access the resources in the South, they resorted to violence to attain their objectives. Ramsbotham, Woohouse & Miall (2005), referencing work by Collier and the World Bank, describe “greed and predation”  (p. 140), as primary motives for civil war. Climate change has brought prolonged drought and crop failure to many regions of Sudan, and as large agribusinesses continue to expand their operations, the fragile detente between the previously warring parties is perilously close to becoming unraveled once more (Sudan: Rich Farms, Conflict and Climate Change, 2008). In addition, oil revenues, which were to be split between the North and South, are threatening to destabilize the delicate balance that has been created. The Abyei region, with its rich oil reserves, straddles the border between the two states; it was to have its own ‘referendum” to decide whether to join the North or South (Zimeta, 2011). Recent developments reveal that both North and South Sudan are concerned about military moves foreshadowing a precipitous land grab to forestall the other from accessing and monopolizing the oil fields (Zimeta, 2011). Because of what have been described as “poorly defined property rights” (Zimeta, 2011) in Sudan and throughout Africa, it is considerably easier for one group or another to seize occupied land and establish a “legal claim” according to Western laws, giving them access to the resources enjoyed by the previous occupants (Zimeta, 2011). Bashir has used a “scorched earth” policy to do just that in Darfur, and it is feared that he will resort to this tactic again in Abyei, in order to seize control of the oil (Zimeta, 2011).

North and South Sudan are locked in a stalemate at this time, each using zero sum thinking; as Pruitt and Kim (2004) would explain, they have become “cognitively entrapped in the conflict [and] committed to continue by...the need to justify prior costs” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, p. 175). Although they did agree to a referendum and appear to abide by the results, they are yet caught up in a cycle of violence and potential aggression based upon access to resources, whether they be agricultural land or oil revenues. Unequal distribution of wealth, when carried to its extreme-- to the point that people are either displaced from their homes and environment or are no longer able to survive independently, fuels social conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005); in Sudan, the actions of the Jellaba started the insurgency against them, and their relentless move to annex lands by force, prolonged and broadened the conflict until it had engulfed the entire nation.

In conclusion, the conflict in Sudan is rooted in economic issues. The Jellaba of North Sudan began a policy of seizing land in the rich agricultural regions of southern Sudan, to expand their agribusinesses. In addition, Sudan’s oil fields are located in the southern area, making it a tempting target for appropriation as well. Displacing hundreds of thousands of indigenous people, using ‘scorched earth’ tactics and outright genocide, the Sudanese government resisted international efforts to stop the violence until it was unable to effectively counter the numerous insurgent groups fighting it and reluctantly signed a peace agreement. The critical issues that impede conflict resolution at this time include ongoing drought, which impedes their ability sustain themselves agriculturally, an undeveloped infrastructure, preventing them from successfully marketing their resources, influence from foreign companies whose sights are focused on their oil fields, and who do not hesitate to pit one group against the other (Zimeta, 2011), and the ongoing distrust and maneuvering for advantage between the different factions. It is highly unlikely that these obstacles will be overcome as long as the two nations are locked in stalemate and have not resolved their fundamental issue, which is economic disparity. Perhaps, with effective mediating, which will help them “identify, reframe and sequence” the central issues of their dispute (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) and create new alternatives (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) (such as cooperative ventures to share oil revenues—an agreement they had reached but which was not balanced and fair), both North and South Sudan will realize that it is to their mutual advantage to join forces and use their many advantages to benefit every citizen, as opposed to just a few at the top.

Works Cited

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operations in Darfur. (2010). Retrieved April 28, 2010, from UNAMID: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/

Dagne, T. (2009). Sudan: The crisis in Darfur and the Status of the North-South Peace Agreement. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Dagne, T., & Everett, B. (2004). Sudan: The Darfur Crisis and the Status of the North-South Negotiations. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Darfur-Australia Network. (2010). Retrieved April 28, 2010, from http://www.darfuraustralia.org/darfur/background

Pruitt, D., & Kim, S. H. (2004). Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2005). Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: Polity.

Smith, D. (2009, October 29). Analyzing President Obama's New Sudan Policy. Retrieved April 28, 2011, from International Affairs Review: http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/83

Sudan: Rich Farms, Conflict and Climate Change. (2008, May 22). Retrieved April 28, 2010, from Integrated Regional Information Networks: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,45a5fb512,45a5fba52,4836929b26,0.html

Suliman, M. (1994). Civil War in Sudan: The Impact of Ecological Degradation. Retrieved October 26, 2009, from University of Pennsylvania-African Studies center: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/cvlw_env_sdn.html

The Darfur Emergency: Current Conflict and International Response. (2004). International Debates , 166-168.

Zimeta, M. (2011, March 31). After Peaceful Vote, Oil Wealth Threatens to Return Sudan to Violence. Retrieved April 28, 2011, from The Atlantic: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/after-peaceful-vote-oil-wealth-threatens-to-return-sudan-to-violence/73274/

Privatizing education--good move or poor choice?

In state after state, legislatures have cut education funds and asked school districts to make do with less. Aides are laid off, teachers fired, programs cut, supplies reduced, schools consolidated. We are told we have to do this because there is no money, budgets must be balanced, everyone has to sacrifice.

But of course, we know that none of this is true. The money that was there two years ago is still out there—it hasn’t magically vanished from the planet. No- it has shifted ownership—from the 98% to the 2%. Through a number of illicit and unethical machinations, a small number of people have manipulated a massive transfer of funds, on a global scale. The money is still there, it’s just in their bank accounts now, as opposed to ours. And because they have appropriated this money, and have no intention of giving it back, we have to make do with less.   

Of course, that’s a simplistic explanation, but not far from accurate. The consequences of these choices are impacting our children, though, and their futures. In Indiana, the GOP has gone into overdrive to continue this money transfer, by initiating a series of legislative maneuvers to legalize paying private entities to educate the children of Indiana at tax payer expense. The “Choice Scholarship” (HB 1003) just implemented, gives low income families thousands of tax dollars to send their children to private schools. Vouchers on steroids, if you will. While numerous families support this move, because it allows them to pull their children out of low quality public schools, they fail to see the big picture. As the program grows (this year, only a few thousand are allowed to participate), funds for public schools will dwindle ever more as children are placed in increasing numbers in private schools. This is a death knell for public education. But wait! That’s not all!

HB 1479, (http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2011/IN/IN1479.1.html ) would turn all low performing schools in Indiana over to private corporations to run for five years. At this point, over 200 schools have been nominated for this transfer. After the end of the contract, the schools could be converted into “independent school corporations.” It is not clear what is meant by that term. During the five year period, the independent contractors would pay $1 a year to lease the property, the materials and supplies from the district, could hire their own employees and would essentially run the school as they saw fit.

Reduced funding for public schools will result in poorer programs and overcrowded classes, meaning an ever increasing flight by families toward better quality schools. The greater the number of private entities functioning on a competitive market basis, the more difficult it will be to monitor outcomes. Indiana has set itself up for an accounting nightmare; short sighted families who have supported these moves are contributing to their own future misery.

The question we have to ask ourselves is—should we pay private corporations to educate our children? There are a number of excellent private universities that provide superior programs (take Stanford for example)—so, the concepts of excellence and private ownership are not mutually exclusive.

 If we do decide to close our public schools, should we continue paying taxes, to support the private entities? I say no. If states want to relinquish their control over schools and educational outcomes, then they also relinquish the dollars involved and close their dysfunctional departments of education. Privatize all the way, be done with it, and allow the citizens to make choices based on competition and free market principles.

If, on the other hand, citizens choose to continue public education, then remove private schools from public funding, keep them separate. Put school funding on referendums and institute the choices made by the people. I can guarantee they will not choose corporate tax cuts at the expense of their child’s educational well being. Public schools should be fully funded and considered, by the state and the people, as an investment in the future.

As long as the economy continues to falter, these choices will increase in urgency. The push to privatize is a well coordinated, well funded agenda by groups who would like nothing better than to use our tax dollars to enrich themselves. I urge every one of you to closely examine proposals your state is advancing that will result in loss of control over your child's education, while benefiting a private company--or many. Virtual academies are part of this group; while some are state-run, most are not.

This is a democracy; self-determination is a fundamental principle, with all its implications of vigilance as to what the government is doing.

War with Iran: Poor Choices, Miscalculations and Hubris

In their book How to Stop a War; Lessons of Two Hundred Years of War and Peace, James Dunnigan and William Martel (1987) listed a number of trends nations fall into as they decide to go to war. Some of these are:

1.      Wars frequently start by accident—leaders miscalculate, politicians swagger and events spiral out of control. This week, a nuclear scientist was openly assassinated in Iran—a clear indication of hubris, most likely Israeli. While one could say the Israeli are deliberately setting the stage for war, it is debatable whether they comprehend the regional and global implications of their imbecilic choices.

2.      The military usually recommends against a military solution—Military professionals understand the devastation caused by armed conflict, and are not in a rush to engage the perceived enemy. While the US command has signaled its preparedness should the President give the word, General Dempsey (CJCS) has characterized a potential conflict with Iran as a “tragedy for the region and the world (Telegraph UK 1/12/12)

3.      Ignorance of “the enemy” is usually a prime basis for war—Aggressors rarely defeat their victims. “Usually,” Dunnigan and Martel (1987) asserted, “aggressors miscalculate their own combat power, that of their victim, or both.” The history of the United States is replete with examples of miscalculations based upon poor intelligence, lack of knowledge, and willful ignorance (refusing to listen to expert assessments). The just completed invasion and occupation of Iraq stands out as a prime example of US miscalculations based upon ignorance of Islam and sectarian violence, and the administration’s fantasy-based concept of being welcomed with open arms as they plotted to entrench US interests in that oil-rich nation. Iran is not a small, weak country that can be simply bombed into submission. Americans still think their technology is the ultimate solution to winning a war with relatively few casualties. While Iran has nowhere near the American capability, they do have a formidable army and will call upon their Shi'a allies in the region to support their defense ( see the 1/2009 issue of Military Technology for a relatively recent appraisal of their capabilities). Attacking Iran will be a bloody, drawn out quagmire, make no mistake about it—if it remains a regional conflict. Should Russian and China intervene, it could start World War III.

4.      American ignorance of war is feared by allies and enemies alike. It appears that other nations perceive our military to be “massive and amateurish” and Americans as simplistic in their outlook. The fact that we export our aggression to other nations is telling—we would be much less eager to start these conflicts if we were suffering the consequences at home.

5.      An important part of  large wars is faulty memory. Especially if your leaders are crowing and strutting about “winning” wars and “mission accomplished,” when no such thing happened. We did not ‘win” in Iraq, we were outmaneuvered and essentially thrown out by the Iraqis who refused to allow us to establish permanent bases on their soil—which was the original intent for the invasion.

The role of propaganda in starting wars must also be critically examined. Nations are not generally eager to start fights—they remember the lost loved ones, the economic downturns, the fear.  Governments must inflate perceived threats, and begin a steady drum roll of lies, distortions and imagined grievances to garner popular support. As Dunnigan and Martel (1987) explained:

Governments entering a war voluntarily will attempt to prepare the population through propaganda and patriotic cheerleading....When a war begins, heroes quickly appear, even if some of them have to be invented. Many nations often designate every dead soldier a hero. After all, who’s to protest? Hope, often without much basis in fact, becomes a common currency of the government and the population....When the initial flush of patriotism has worn off, warring governments must take measures to keep the population in a properly warlike mood. The government and the mass media will hammer away repeatedly that the war was the right decision, that “we” are on the right side of the issues and that retribution must be made for wrongs committed by the enemy.

What exactly has Iran done that would provoke our attack, and the beginning of a regional conflict inevitably resulting in thousands of innocent victims, the demolishing of critical infrastructure, and the possibility of a world war? They are refining uranium and “might” decide to develop a nuclear bomb. Leon Panetta just last week declared that they do not have a bomb nor are they close to having one. Iran is surrounded by nuclear powers, including Israel. Their motivation for acquiring the bomb seems obvious. That we would envision attacking them to deprive them of what everyone else already has is the height of hypocrisy and a clear indicator of more sinister motives. Think big oil. This situation is being created by entities whose profits will skyrocket should they achieve hegemony in the Middle East, and control of world oil supplies.

Let’s all remember that these are people telling us these lies, these are people sitting around meeting room tables discussing options and how to get our support for their ventures. These are people who stand to profit from our sacrifice. The government is made up of American men and women with agendas and ideologies. They are our employees, on our payroll. If we surrender our well being to these people, whose intentions are dubious, and who have demonstrated a complete, callous indifference to the consequences of their poorly thought out choices, we, in a way, deserve the suffering we will endure.

Dunnigan, J. & Martel, W. (1987) How to Stop a War: The Lessons of Two Hundred Years of War and Peace. New York, NY: Doubleday.

Jus Ad Bellum--Just War Theory

In view of the new war looming on our horizon, which will be to supposedly "prevent" Iran from developing nuclear weapons,and our new policy of preemptive action against anyone (including American citizens) whom we feel might at some time decide to attack, I felt it appropriate to publish an analysis of the Iraq war I wrote last year, which concluded that it did not begin to meet the criteria of a Just War. Perhaps this can be a reminder to American citizens that they are entitled to demand a less bellicose approach to international affairs than we have used in the last decade.

                                                        Jus Ad Bellum

“War is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will”-- Carl Von Clausewitz (1832).           

“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” –Chapter I, Article 2, (4) Charter of the United Nations.

            “Jus ad bellum” (Just War) is a theoretical set of constructs that propose to determine whether a projected conflict can be justified legally and morally.  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lists six basic criteria: the war must have a just cause, be fought with the right intentions, can only be initiated by the right authorities, should have some degree of probability of success, and be proportional to the provocation (Orend, 2005). Although these appear to be straight forward, the truth is that interpretations and ambiguities abound in each and every one, making a definite analysis of a conflict according to “Jus ad bellum” difficult. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was supposedly a defensive move against a country with known ties to the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attack, a large arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, and plans to use these to establish a hegemonic presence in the Middle East, thus threatening our national security. This paper will examine the justifications for Operation Iraqi Freedom through the lenses of ‘Just cause,” “Right Intentions” and “Proportionality” to demonstrate that it did not meet the criteria of Jus ad bellum...

            Just Cause

“Just Cause” norms include self defense against outside aggression, defending others from unjustified attacks, protecting the defenseless, and punishment for wrongdoings by one group against another (Orend, 2005). The stated objectives for Operation Iraqi freedom were to

“End the regime of Saddam Hussein, identify, isolate and eliminate, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, to search for, capture and drive out terrorists from the country, collect intelligence related to terrorist networks, collect such intelligence as is related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction, end sanctions and  immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and needy citizens, secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people and finally, help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government.” (Pike, 2005) (editing mine).

The premises upon which some of these ends are based are somewhat dubious. Although Hussein had, over the years (since before the Iran-Iraq war), possessed  biological and chemical weapons and had made some progress in developing a nuclear program,  inspection teams from the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMVOIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IEEA) combed Iraq from November 2002 to March 2003 and failed to uncover any nuclear arsenal as claimed to exist by the United States (Squassoni, 2003). The links between Al-Qaeda (perpetrators of the 9/11 attack) and Iraq were tenuous and posed no immediate threat to the United States (as opposed to the known presence of Bin Laden in Afghanistan) (Schmitt, 2004 ). The goals of ending the sanctions leveraged by the Security Council in 1990 (Sanctions Against Iraq, 2005) seems laudable except for the fact that the United States repeatedly blocked their removal until after the invasion of 2003 (Sanctions Against Iraq, 2005). It seems evident that based on even a cursory review, the invasion of Iraq did not meet the basic premises of being a just cause; there was no immediate threat to the United States and was not aimed at defending a helpless people against attack.

Right Intentions

This criterion states that  the war must be fought for just causes only and not be motivated by any hidden agendas such as resource acquisition or contol (Orend, 2005). This particular issue has become contentious as far as the invasion of Iraq is concerned, as there has  been ongoing speculation about the United States using this attack to position itself as the hegemon in the Middle east and thus pre-empt any attempts to control the oil industry there. The fact that Allan Greenspan stated quite openly in his book that the Iraq war is “largely about oil” (as cited in Weissman, 2007) and that removing Hussein was a move to keep oil production in friendly hands (Weissman, 2007) have confirmed some of these doubts. Forcible regime change as a result of legal military action is considered acceptable (Schmitt, 2004 ) but premeditated regime change is not. There is evidence that members of the Bush administration had conceived plans to overthow Hussein as far back as 1998, when they openly petitioned President Clinton to invade Iraq and depose its leader (Abrams, Armitage, Bennett, & al, 1998). Although these issues might be considered tenuous in some circles, they do indicate a failure to meet the “Right Intentions” clause of a just war.

Proportionality

            The question in this area is whether or not  the bombing,  invasion and occupation of Iraq were proportionate responses to the perceived danger. Although seemingly almost impossible to tally correctly,there is consensus that the civilian casualties in Iraq  since the beginning of the war number in the tens of thousands dead and wounded (Fischer, 2005). The infrastructure of the country was severely damaged and has not yet recovered fully, while the social fabric has been rent opening the way for explosive ethnic and religious conflicts. If the stated purpose of the invasion was to save the people of Iraq from their oppressor and eliminate the threat of the use of WMDs, it would seem that they have paid a heavy price for their (unasked for) liberation.  Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom fail the proportionality condition of a just war.

  James Dunnigan and William Martel (1987), state that there are four basic causes of war: Long Standing Grievances, Internal Disorder, Sense of Military Superiority, and the Fear of Being Attacked (Dunnigan & Martel, 1987).  The United States, with its newly worded National Security Strategy document of 2002 (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html), seems to have added “anticipatory attacks” to the list. Charles Kegley and Shannon Blanton (2010) question the validity of pre-emptive attacks, based on an imminent, credible threat, versus “preventive” attacks, based upon the fear that one might occur at some time in the future.  It appears that the first can be considered legitimate under the just war definition, whereas the second does not. Preventive warfare legitimizes paranoia, violence as mediator and lowers accountability standards. This was the primary difficulty with the rationalizations surrounding the invasion and occupation of Iraq: they tried to justify a preventive war while ignoring international opinion which expected adherence to the principles of a just war.

Works Cited

Abrams, E., Armitage, R., Bennett, W., & al, e. (1998, January 26). Letter to President Clinton. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from project for the New American Century: http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm

Carl von Clausewtiz.s Definitions of War. (2010, Feb 5). Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Clausewtiz.com: http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/grimsley1/h380/on_war.htm

Dunnigan, J., & Martel, W. (1987). How to Stop a war: Lessons of Two Hundred Years of War and Peace. New York: Doubleday.

Fischer, H. (2005, April 6). U.S. Military and Iraqi Casualty Statistics:Additional Numbers and Explanations. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from CRS Report for Congress: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22126.pdf

Orend, B. (2005, July 28). War. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/#2.1

Pike, J. (2005, April 27). Operation Iraqi Freedom. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Global Security.org: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom.htm

Sanctions Against Iraq. (2005). Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Global Policy Forum: http://www.globalpolicy.org/iraq/previous-issues-and-debate-on-iraq/sanctions-against-iraq.html

Schmitt, R. (2004 ). The Legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom under International Law. Journal of Military Ethics , 82-104.

Squassoni, S. (2003, October 7). Iraq: UN Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from CRS Report for Congress: http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31671.pdf

Weissman, R. (2007, September 17). Greenspan, Kissinger. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from Global Policy.org: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/40691.html