Nation-State Versus Ethnic and Regional Autonomy: How Eastern Europe is Faring.

“Cossack! Do not sleep. In the gloomy dark the Chechen roams beyond the river...”

                                                                                                (Aleksander Pushkin, 1820)  

The end of the Cold War and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring universal peace. Instead, small states and outlaying regions incorporated into the monolithic USSR, realizing an opportunity to attain a long-sought autonomy, pressed for independence and established their own states. The splintering did not end there, however; many of these newly self-governing entities were soon confronted with secessionist bids of their own, generally from ethnic groups seeking self rule, in many cases due to oppression suffered at the hands of majority ethnic groups whose grip on power and economic advantages did not loosen after the demise of the Soviet state. Georgia is one of these last, trying to maintain its hold on two breakaway provinces; Chechnya is a region struggling to free itself from Russia’s long held imperial clutch, while Azerbaijan fights with Armenia over territory each would like to claim. In every case, the underlying paradigm appears to be fervor to preserve the nation-state as the sole legitimate entity, opposed by a new outlook, which demands equality regardless of minority status, and the opportunity to develop a different type of community, wherein culture and ethnicity are celebrated and member are allowed complete autonomy. As of right now, this dichotomous set of ideas has led to violence and brutal attempts to suppress any threats to the status quo.   

Georgia

After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the southwestern states of Chechnya, Georgia, and Azerbaijan were among those calling for independence (CIS, 2011). Many newly self-governing states created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Although Russia supported this move, and ratified a treaty with them, it never lost the desire to maintain close political and economic ties, presumably because of their strategic location. Russia has been steadily working towards re-integrating these states into its sphere of influence by manipulating the “post independence instability” (CIS, 2011) within many of these republics by posting troops along its southern border; it hopes to convince the UN and CSCE that their military presence in the region is legitimate (CIS, 2011). A number of states within CIS have cooperated in a move to create closer economic and military ties with Russia; Georgia, however, has carefully sidestepped any attempts to maneuver it into this agreement and in 2008 withdrew completely, instead opting for a rapprochement with Europe and the United States and requesting to be granted membership in NATO, to safeguard it against Russian threats (CIS, 2011). NATO’s consideration of this application made the Russians very nervous and is thought to have inspired their heavy-handed interference in Georgia’s struggle with its breakaway province of South Ossetia (Bloomfield, 2008).

            South Ossetia was the focus of international attention in 2008 when Georgia attacked secessionist rebels and consequently was confronted by invading Russian troops occupying South Ossetia, ostensibly to protect ethnic Russians living there (Bloomfield, 2008). Even though it was now fighting Russian troops and not just rebel forces, Georgia would not agree to uphold a cease-fire, provoking an all-out attack from Russia. Both nations finally agreed to an US and EU brokered agreement but accused each other of ethnic cleansing and genocide (Booth, 2008). Russia now occupies South Ossetia and the neighboring region of Abkhazia, ostensibly to protect their independence (Booth, 2008) . Georgia broke diplomatic relations with Russia after the incident, but in a very recent development, has agreed to talk with Russia about allowing it to join the WTO, which it had resisted because of the ongoing disagreement over Ossetia (Washington calls on Georgia to allow Russian WTO entry - Biden, 2011). In a more ominous move, however, Georgia has been courting the United States in a bid to purchase sophisticated weaponry; an indication that it has no real intention of granting Russia a prolonged occupation of territories it considers Georgian (Spiegel, 2009).

Chechnya

The lands that border Russia to the south, in the Caucasus region, are Russia’s hotbed of terrorism. Recent estimates calculate that 80% of all terrorist attacks occur in the north Caucasus region, up 60% in 2009 from the previous year (King & Menon, 2011). It seems that there are no victims too innocent for these attacks—in Russia in 2004, a school full of children were targeted, killing 300; two years earlier, a theater hostage-taking episode took the lives of 170 theater-goers, and numerous other incidents have killed train as well as airline passengers (King & Menon, 2011). As usual, the response has been heavy handed and violent, leading to a cycle of escalation, with no end or resolution in sight.

Historically, Chechnya has been a Russia’s difficult child. During their 19^th century imperialistic expansionary period, Russia occupied the Caucasus Mountains in an effort to contain the Ottoman and Persian empires (King & Menon, 2011). Ruling Chechnya was a particularly thorny issue; in other regions, the strategy had been to appoint well-known local elites, whose loyalty was not in doubt, to rule the new provinces (King & Menon, 2011). However, Chechnya is mountainous and rugged and difficult to access, so Russia had to resort to picking native elites to rule, resulting in numerous rebellions and constant fighting to maintain some stability in the region (King & Menon, 2011). This was the beginning of a system of brutal repression culminating in Stalin’s deportation of nearly half a million inhabitants to Central Asia (allegedly for collaborating with the Nazis); when they returned after the war it was imbued with a sense of injustice and what has been described as a “narrative of historical oppression” (King & Menon, 2011). In 1994, when Chechnya demanded it be granted independence from Russia, Boris Yeltsin attacked with overwhelming force, resulting in heavy casualties; in 1996, he negotiated a cease-fire, which granted some degree of autonomy but not the requested independence (King & Menon, 2011). Since then, Putin has also launched offensives against Chechnya, this time to suppress the terrorism erupting from the region (King & Menon, 2011).

Chechnya has also struggled with high-level corruption; although Russia has invested in economic development in the region, it appears that large portions are siphoned off, resulting in ongoing poverty and resentment (King & Menon, 2011). Islam, therefore, has experienced resurgence as a message of hope for the oppressed, along with nationalistic fervor and a determination to resist the Russian military occupation (King & Menon, 2011). In addition to these factors, though, is a sense of ambiguity—Chechnya is neither Russian nor independent, a conundrum it cannot resolve with terrorism. The question that needs to be answered is, whether granting every ethnic group autonomy will weaken the sense of community enjoyed within a nation state, or strengthen the bonds of civil society as each group fulfills what it perceives as its own potential. Russia has answered in the negative. It remains to be seen whether it can maintain its hold on this small breakaway state.

Azerbaijan

The conflict in Azerbaijan revolves around a small region within its borders occupied by ethnic Armenians (Nagorno Karabakh), who seek to either become part of neighboring Armenia or an independent state (Migdalovitz, 2003). After the breakup of the Soviet Union, this territorial tug of war exploded, resulting in heavy losses and over a million refugees (Migdalovitz, 2003). There have been numerous international interventions, but until the two states resolve the issue of whom Nagorno Karabakh legitimately belongs to, or whether they can agree to grant it self-rule, a resolution seems distant.

 The Armenian perspective is that Azerbaijan in all likelihood intends to oust the ethnic Armenians from Karabakh and they must be protected (Migdalovitz, 2003). They have refused to recognize Karabakh’s declaration of independence from Azerbaijan, due to fears that doing so might provoke Azerbaijan into declaring war, assisted by its ally Turkey (Migdalovitz, 2003). It has been supplying arms, food, supplies, and funds to Karabakh to support the insurgency (Migdalovitz, 2003). In 2001 the Armenian parliament issued a list of conditions for stopping the confrontation with Azerbaijan; these include “unification of Karabakh with Armenia or an international confirmation of its independent status, the participation of Karabakh authorities in drafting the final settlement, a sufficient common border of Armenia and Karabakh that would guarantee the security of Karabakh, and the fixing of a border with Azerbaijan” (Migdalovitz, 2003, p. 12).

             The Azeri view is that granting autonomy to Karabakh would be opening the door Armenian efforts to eventually laying claim to other Azeri regions (Migdalovitz, 2003). They claim that Armenia has interfered in its internal affairs and that it will not deal with any self proclaimed Karabakhi government; if Armenia were to recognize this last, it would consider that a declaration of war (Migdalovitz, 2003). They might be willing to consider giving Karabakh” more rights, but not independence” (Migdalovitz, 2003, p. 14).

What we can make of these examples

              In every case, the conflict centers around a desire for self-rule, generally based on ethnic differentiation. In Georgia’s case, after achieving its independence, it refused to grant the same to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, initiating a war of suppression that eventually backfired when Russia stepped in. Chechnya is seeking release from Russia’s long held imperial grip and has exported its terrorism to Moscow, where it can have maximum impact. Armenia and Azerbaijan are struggling over control of a small province within Azerbaijan, using the people of Karabakh as collateral in their determination to prove the ascendancy of the nation -state over the claims of an ethnic group seeking self-determination or to be rejoined with their peers.

             Russia’s intervention in Georgia’s conflict can be seen as a form of “coercive commitment” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004), in that they are dedicated to continuing their presence in South Ossetia until Georgia grants it independence, ostensibly to protect the ethnic Russians residing there.  The Georgians can “blame” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) Russia for escalating the conflict as it interfered knowing full well that this would precipitate a crisis. Georgia’s ongoing sanctions against Russia are a manifestation of its continuing sense of outrage. The Chechens are using “instrumental violence” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) to punish Russia for refusing to grant them independence and continuing to support the oppressive corrupt regime they installed. In many ways, their actions can be seen as “image threats,” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) since the very act of penetrating deep into the Russian homeland to commit acts of terrorism threatens Russia’s sense of security and its status as a power that can effectively deter threats against it.  Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to be caught up in a form of “tit for tat” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004), each determined to claim control over the Karabakh region. They have “hostile attitudes and perceptions” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) of each other, inflamed by grudges they still hold about injustices committed against them by Russia in the past, and assumptions they currently have about each other’s intentions.

            The three conflicts are based upon a Westphalian concept of nation-state sovereignty and the refusal to grant autonomy to ethnic groups, perhaps due to fear of losing that central governing structure upon which the model is based. Each state, whether large or small, has allowed some degree of splintering—Georgia and Azerbaijan were granted independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but then set up a stiff resistance to demands for further reductions in the size and number of autonomous regions. Until these centuries’ old paradigms are shifted, it seems likely that the struggles for self-determination will continue, because as each group is allowed some autonomy, others, seeing this, begin to clamor for their own. We are, in effect, witnessing the beginning of the end of this Westphalian model.

Bloomfield, A. (2008, August 8). Georgia:Russia enters war in South Ossetia. Retrieved May 10, 2011, from The telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2525400/Georgia-Russia-enters-into-war-in-South-Ossetia.html

Booth, J. (2008, August 12). Georgia Timeline: How Crisis Unfolded. Retrieved May 10, 2011, from The Sunday Times: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4514939.ece

CIS. (2011). Retrieved May 10, 2011, from Global Security: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/cis.htm

King, C., & Menon, R. (2011). Prisoners of the Caucasus: Russia's Invisible Civil War. Foreign Affairs , 20-34.

Migdalovitz, C. (2003). Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service.

Pruitt, D., & Kim, S. H. (2004). Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Spiegel, P. (2009, July 24). Wall Street Journal ,  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124835911309475853.html.

Washington calls on Georgia to allow Russian WTO entry - Biden. (2011, March 10). Retrieved May 10, 2011, from RIANOVOSTI: http://en.rian.ru/world/20110310/162941235.html

Hugo Chavez: Despot or Savior?

“Socialism, this is the direction, this is the path to save the planet, I don't have the least doubt.  Capitalism is the road to hell, to the destruction of the world.  We say this from Venezuela, which because of socialism faces threats from the U.S. empire—“ Hugo Chavez, speaking at the 15th International Conference of the United Nations on Climate Change, Denmark, Wednesday, 16 December 2009.

“Liberalism seemed to have triumphed—not merely capitalism but democracy and the rule of law, as represented in the West, and particularly in the United States”(Keohane and Nye, 2001, as quoted in Kegley Jr & Blanton, 2010, 108).

             An interesting dynamic is taking place internationally; even as globalization is spreading capitalist ideals of individualism and entrepreneurship, many are turning away from its principles and embracing socialism instead. Francis Fukuyama’s optimistic “End of History “(1992) theory implies that the tenets of capitalism and democracy have been accepted as valid by most nations (Kegley Jr & Blanton, 2010), but even a cursory glance beyond the western hemisphere creates some doubt as to the validity of that thesis. China, although espousing many aspects of free market principles and encouraging foreign investment, is far from becoming a democracy; studies in China have found a majority support of the communist government (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2006, 423). Venezuela, although profiting from its rich oil reserves, has also veered away from capitalism and embraced a form of populist socialism that violates most principles of privatization; its leader, Hugo Chavez, has continued to portray capitalism as an evil to be eradicated. Is his brand of socialism a new paradigm or simply an attempt to use the poverty and deprivation of his compatriots for political advantage?  This author feels that Chavez’s struggle to empower the poor of Venezuela is more than political posturing, but cannot represent a real paradigm shift in that it does not represent any new ideas, does not have the support of all Venezuelans and is thus  doomed to create continued conflict and worsen the situation of those whom he proclaims to wish to help.

            Venezuela’s position as a major player in the world economy is based upon its oil reserves, which account for 90% of its exports earnings and 50% of its federal budget revenues (Venezuela, 2010) .  Almost one half of its people, however, live below poverty levels (Venezuela, 2010) and the per capita GDP is only $13,000 (Venezuela, 2010). Between 1958 and 1978, Venezuela became a model of democracy—“successful, institutionalized, stable and legitimate” (Lander, 2005 , 25). The people, although living in a multi tiered society based on income disparity, experienced a sufficient degree of upward mobility to lead them to expect the creation of a “modern integrated society” (Lander, 2005, 26 ).This growing affluence lasted until the oil crisis of 1978, after which its economy was characterized by a gradual downward slide in individual prosperity and a doubling of total poverty in the country, from 36% to 68% (Lander, 2005,26 ). Because of its fragile basis, the financial system did not have the resilience to withstand any serious shock; the social fabric of Venezuela, also basing its legitimacy upon the expectation of ever increasing material wealth and modernization, was equally flimsy and quickly disintegrated along with the economy (Lander, 2005 ). Political elites, determined to maintain their status and wealth, aggravated the situation with their attempts at institutionalizing democratic processes without seeking to legitimize the government by seeking the participation of the majority; instead, they created an exclusionary system that favored their own (Lander, 2005 ). It was in this increasingly polarized and unstable environment that Chavez was elected on a populist platform.

When Chavez came to office 1998, he sought to counter the neoliberal policies being promoted by the United States and other western nations, which included privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation and encouraging direct foreign investment (Washington Consensus, 2003). These approaches were seen as creating opportunities for exploitation by multinational corporations and as a means for a furthering of the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of major corporations at the expense of the workers (Lander, 2005 ). Edgar Lander has commented that the neoliberal policies of western nations exacerbated inequalities in Latin America and that “…democratic political processes became progressivley emptier,(and) the recommendations of the multinational organizations came to be more important than the will of the voters, public opinion or parliamentary decisions…” (Lander, 2005,24 ). Thus, Chavez’s approach emphasizing popular and national autonomy, his willingness to oppose the wealthy elite and his apparent empathy with the plight of the people resonated with the majority of Venezuelans and have given him a platform from which to promote his agenda of socialist populism.

Hugo Chavez is, according to Steve Ellner of Oriente University (Venezuela), the first freely elected head in Latin America (since Alan Garcia of Peru) to openly “defy the hegemonic powers of the “new world order” (Ellner, 2002) as well as powerful multinational corporations and political actors (Ellner, 2002). His thesis, which emphasizes “globalization’s unequal distribution of wealth,” (Ellner, 2002) also brings out the concept of a multi-polar world which would be in direct opposition to American hegemony (Ellner, 2002). Ellner contends that Chavez is worried that globalization will increasingly marginalize the governmental institutions of small nations, making them subject to the directives of large hegemonic states and federations (such as the EU). This concern has led to increasingly confrontational encounters with state leaders and has led to calls for his removal or even his assassination (see “Pat Robertson Calls for Assassination of Hugo Chavez,” USA Today 8/22/2005). His nationalization of the oil industry and redirection of the profits to benefit the poor and rebuild the infrastructure of Venezuela, along with other socialist type approaches to wealth distribution, have made him a pariah among the wealthy elites and led to a number of attempts to remove him from office. The rhetoric on both sides has become increasingly vitriolic as those who profit from the current world economy struggle against any intrusions or challenges to the favorable status quo, while those who would change the balance of power attack those holding it.

The question of whether Chavez is altruistically trying to equalize Venezuelan society or simply using popular discontent as a propellant for his own political ambitions is difficult to answer, considering the “fog of emotion” that surrounds him, both negative and positive. Amy Chua describes the controversy surrounding Chavez as being caused in part by his flamboyance:

“He stopped privatization of the oil sector, outlawed large landowners, and guaranteed free education and worker benefits for housewives. He decreed almost fifty anti-market laws. In 2001, Chavez threatened to nationalize all banks that refuse—in accordance with one of Chavez’s new laws, to grant credit to small farmers and small businesses” (Chua, 2003,143).

In addition, Chavez “played the ethnic card,” (Chua, 2003, 143), using his own mixed ethnic background to create a sense of commonality with the dispossessed of Venezuela, most of which come from indigenous or mixed ethnic heritage (as opposed to the wealthy elite, descendants of Spanish colonialists). These actions polarized Venezuelan society and led to marches and rallies by the wealthy and (worried) middle class—marches held in the wealthy quarters of Caracas—while the poor marched in support simultaneously in the slums of the city (Ellner, 2003). Kurt Weyland feels that “populism” per se is “best defined as a political strategy” (Weyland, 2001, 18), is successful when “personalistic leaders base their rule on massive yet mostly uninstutionalized support from large numbers of people” (Weyland, 2001, 18), and is basically nothing more than a quest for power. If this is true, then Hugo Chavez’s “Socialism for the 21^st century” is nothing more than posturing and an excuse for despotism. This seems too dismissive and simplistic to me; I feel that Chavez could have easily rested upon his laurels when first elected and accomodated the oil industry’s magnates to enrich himself as have so many despots in Latin America and other regions of the world. Instead, he championed the poor and has made some serious enemies as he continues to revamp the Venezuelan politcal system into what can best be called a form of socialist democracy.

            In conclusion, it seems fair to say that “Socialism for the 21^st century” does not necessarily represent a new alternative, nor is it exactly an excuse for despotism. Instead, there is some evidence that Hugo Chavez represents a legitimization of the anger of the poor, who have been the disproportionate victims of the economic policies of their own government, designed to favor the wealthy elites. Whereas neoliberalist market reforms and trade policies have in general made the business environment better for corporations, the resulting affluence has not “trickled down” to the people. Although there is considerable debate about the real effects of liberalization in Latin America, there is consensus about the fact that poverty rates have almost doubled in the past decade and a half and that inequality continues to plague the region (Korzeniewicz & Smith, 2000).  Inasmuch as the wealthy elites running governments control the police forces and military, and the poor have little or no access to weapons, any social unrest that threatens the interests of those in power is generally quickly quelled with violence. This instills a sense of fear and reluctance to voice opposition to policies that threaten their own ability to survive, much less thrive. Hugo Chavez and other populist leaders such as Evo Morales are speaking up for the oppressed and poverty stricken; whether or not this was their original intent is unclear. What is apparent is that they have created considerable discomfort for those who would prefer to continue with “business as usual” without having to confront the human consequences of their choices.

 

Almond, G., Powell, B., Dalton, R., & Strom, K. (2006). Comparative Politics Today. New York: Longman.

Chavez, H. (2009, December 21). Socialism Is the Path to Save the Planet. Retrieved February 27, 2010, from MR Zine: 15th International Conference of the United Nations on Climate Change, Kingdom of Denmark, Wednesday, 16 December 2009

Chua, A. (2003). World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic hatred and Global Instability. New York: Anchor.

Dougherty, J., & Pfaltzgraff, R. (2001). Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.

Ellner, S. (2002, November). he "Radical" Thesis on Globalization and the Case of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. Retrieved February 27, 2010, from Latin American Perspectives: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3185001

Ellner, S. (2003, Feb). The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chavez and Alberto Fujimori. Retrieved February 27, 2010, from Journal of Latin American Studies: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875581

Kegley Jr, C., & Blanton, S. (2010). World Politics: Trends and Transformation. Boston: Wadsworth.

Korzeniewicz, R., & Smith, W. (2000). Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Latin America: Searching for the High Road to Globalization. Retrieved February 27, 2010, from Latin America Research Review: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692041

Lander, E. (2005 , March). Venezuelan Social Conflict in a Global Context. Retrieved February 27, 2010, from Latin American Perspectives: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040274

Venezuela. (2010). Retrieved February 27, 2010, from World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html

Washington Consensus. (2003). Retrieved February 27, 2010, from Global Trade Negotiations Home Page: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html

Weyland, K. (2001, October). CLarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. Retrieved February 27, 2010, from Comparative Politics: http://jstor.org/stable/422412

Battle of Stalingrad: Revisionism and assumptions.

                                     

       The movie Stalingrad (Kretschmann 1993) portrays the 1942 Nazi attempt to capture the Russian city and its ultimate defeat by the Red Army. While it is anticipated that movies will fictionalize major historical events in order to render them more palatable to audiences—individual characters highlighted, isolated scenes explored in depth to maximize the pathos or elation experienced by protagonists, incidents telescoped or expanded as they serve the underlying purpose of the film— primary sources reflect actual events and are generally considered reliable. If this assumption is correct, history as written should have no variances. This, however, is not the case; although the explanation for discrepancies between reality and revision are multiple, it appears that the lens through which one views the record distorts interpretation to where it becomes difficult to ascertain the truth. The events surrounding the battle of Stalingrad are a case in point; two different interpretations of the German defeat highlight the manner in which individual assumptions can alter the understanding of why circumstances occur.

                        The first explanation examined is written by Brian Hanley (2006),a military officer whose purpose is to emphasize the need for establishing “ends, ways and means” (Hanley 2006) during strategic planning. He begins by describing Hitler’s goals in Russia as, to isolate Stalin in the far eastern portion of Russia by capturing the Ukraine, Moscow, and Leningrad—thus controlling the agricultural and industrial sections, as well as its communications and shipping centers (Hanley 2006). The strategy was formulated in 1940 and, in 1941; the German Wehrmacht had encircled and defeated large segments of the Red Army, taking more than 3 million prisoners and major equipment including 14,000 tanks and 25,000 guns (Hanley 2006). The German defeat at Moscow was predestined because of Hitler’s commands to eliminate those enemy units encircled, as opposed to advancing on Moscow with all due haste. (Hanley 2006). The Command center ignored logistical imperatives (ways and means)—the Wehrmacht was functioning on a gradually attenuating supply line; in fact, “supplies were expected to move great distances, without proper road and rail network, to a front line constantly in flux....the Germans had far too few trucks...the miscellany of captured vehicles the Germans had to rely on could not be kept running...” (Hanley 2006, 89)(omissions mine).   While the Wehrmacht was dealing with these issues, Hitler expanded his war scenario to include targets hundreds of miles from his forces’ primary location, thus forcing them to expend supplies they needed for their primary thrust (Hanley 2006).

                        Stalingrad sits on the Volga River and is proximate to the Don River. Both these major waterways are important shipping lanes and were essential in resupplying the Russian army. Stalingrad was a munitions production hub and a distribution center for raw materials needed for the war effort (Hanley 2006). Hitler’s Sixth Army was ordered to ”cut the supply line immediately north of Stalingrad, which was more than 200 miles east of the front line of the German front” (Hanley 2006). The two armies engaged in July of 1942, and within a month the Sixth Army had successfully slowed river traffic, controlled the rail lines and could now focus on the city. The assumption was that Stalin, having learned from the 1941 assault on Moscow, would order a strategic retreat and regroup until he had gathered sufficient forces for an assault.  Here German tactics created the scenario for their defeat—instead of cutting off  access to the Volga to the north and its potential for resupplying Russian forces within the city, they chose instead to attack Stalingrad head on (Hanley 2006). Because of Russian resistance, the Germans fought for two months and ended up with a fragile hold on a large area occupied by enemy army units and resistance fighters (Hanley 2006). By November, the Russians had in fact regrouped and surrounded what was left of the Sixth Army (Hanley 2006). The author concludes that

Hitler is to blame for the Stalingrad debacle. He did not have the means to achieve his vast and at times incompatible objectives, and when his military chief of staff told him as much he was removed from his position...the German army would have achieved its strategic objective...by taking both banks of the Volga many miles north of Stalingrad. Such a plan would have squared ends, ways and means...[but] the Nazi leader rejected advice from his commanders about aligning his strategic objectives with his operational plan and forces available” (Hanley 2006) (omissions mine).

                         In the article “Fighting for the Truth about the Battle of Stalingrad,” David Glantz and Jonathan House (2009) argue that many of the suppositions about the battle, even if based upon accurate records, are incorrect. One of the central assumptions is that Stalin had been ordered to fall back, based on the first campaign of 1941, where he took heavy casualties (Santoro 2010).  On the contrary, his instructions were to stand and fight at Stalingrad, and to “attack everywhere at every time, in the belief that somewhere someone will break...” (Santoro 2010). The Red Army actually attacked the Germans on the road to Stalingrad, and imposed heavy casualties (Santoro 2010). Glantz and House (2009) explain that there were several major tank battles and that Stalin struck in July, at the “bend of the Don river” (Santoro 2010). This tank battle raged for three weeks and derailed the German strategic plan to seize the city from the north and south in a pincer like move (Santoro 2010). The Russians launched continual counterattacks, keeping the German armored divisions occupied, and preventing the Wehrmacht from entering the northern section of the city. Instead, they were diverted and had to enter from the west; with no armor support, they were literally forced into an urban guerilla warfare scenario, seizing the city in increments, incapable of reaching the northern section to cut off Russian supply lines (Santoro 2010). The Russian strategy at this point was to sacrifice as many men as needed to keep the city from falling completely; it lost tens of thousands of men in the effort. The plan was to “ruthlessly expend manpower, [as] resistance will wear down a numerically weaker opponent (Santoro 2010) (insertion mine). The Red Army’s success had a heavy price, one they were willing to pay to stop the German thrust.

                        In conclusion, battles are massive events and the fog of war prevails. Historians look at the memoirs of generals, and other primary documents to ascertain the true course of events; this is a difficult task at best and made more so when reports conflict. In these two articles, descriptions of how the Battle of Stalingrad was fought and the assumptions made about command decisions is an interesting study in contrasts. Both accounts, while giving the same basic information, are just different enough to give a dissimilar impression of what caused the defeat. The first states logistical failure and the second that Stalin was actually planning to wear down the German effort, before they ever reached the city. Whether it is poor research methodology at work, bias or simply interpretive variance, these subtle inconsistencies make it difficult to determine exactly what occurred and why. Thus, while we describe cinematographic interpretations as mere fiction, the reality is, we each are purveyors of fiction unless we have lived the event described—and even then we are limited by our own perspective.

Works Cited

Glantz, D., and J. House. Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010.

Hanley, Brian. "The Enduring Relevance of the Battle for Stalingrad." JFQ, 2006: 88-92.

Stalingrad. Directed by Joseph Vilsmaier. Performed by Thomas Kretschmann. 1993.

Santoro, Gene. "Fighting for the Truth About the Battle of Stalingrad." Military Review, 2010.