Wednesday, February 29, 2012

Using Public Policy to Push Personal Agendas


In a representative democracy, policy makers ostensibly use the regulatory process to implement regulations designed to make life easier and safer—their choices supposedly guided by the will of the people. As Wedel, Shore, Feldman and Lathrop (2005) noted, though, the policy crafting process is more than establishing “guidelines” or “legal frameworks,” which are neutral sounding euphemisms for ideologically based assumptions about how individuals should function; it is about imposing a standardized version of this behavior and positing that deviance is unacceptable. While there are circumstances within which this is appropriate—such as those laws regulating driving on public highways, or respecting property and personal rights, other social engineering approaches to policy writing are more harmful than helpful. A good case in point is the current debate about women’s reproductive rights.

According to the Guttmacher Institute, states have passed a record number of bills in 2011 designed to restrict women’s access to abortion and certain types of reproductive health care ("States Enact," 2011). These laws are based upon definitional finesses about when life begins, and reflect the personal ideologies of state legislators. Wedel et al.(2005) noted that it is important to understand not only the way policy restricts behaviors, but also how it is used to impose concepts about what it “means to be human” (p. 37). In this context, legally restricting a woman’s right to access certain types of health care, is using policy to define not only what “life” consists of, but also the adulthood and freedom of women. 

Another –and very contrasting--way in which policy is used to establish “normalcy,” is the manner in which the Department of Fish and Wildlife is “managing” wildlife. In Idaho, the DFW is using aerial hunting to drastically reduce the wolf population in the Lolo National Forest, allegedly to raise the number of elk in the area ("Potential," 2011-12). As citizens of the United States, we all own these wolves, yet we are not consulted in any way about how these animal populations are “managed.” The rancher and hunter lobbies are very powerful in western states, and the DFW profits from selling hunting licenses (Iverson-Long, 2010), while some communities benefit financially from hosting hunters. This type of “wildlife management,” it seems, is not based upon what is best for the wolf, the elk, the forest, or the citizens of the United States, but what profits a limited number of individuals. Opposition is “muted” by these groups and supportive policymakers by using arguments that Wedel et al. (2005) have characterized as designed to “mobilize the language of science, reason, and “common sense” (p. 37). Those who prefer to save the wolves and allow nature to establish ecological balance are “tree huggers,” or “kooks,”, while ranchers and hunters are conserving what should be considered “normal,” and traditional. 

These examples serve as reminders that policy reflects the paradigms and worldview of the authors, but not necessarily that of their constituents. The trend we are seeing now where ideologically rigid, hyper conservative individuals use public policy to push their personal worldviews and agendas  is a serious  threat to democracy. Wedel et al.(2005) pointed out that the rhetoric accompanying public policy is rarely examined, nor is it understood as a reflection of personal biases and paradigms, whether shared by a group or not. As such, it can be benign or malevolent, equitable or grossly unjust. Public policy should never be used for social engineering, and should be much easier to dismantle if found to be erroneous or damaging.


References
Iverson-Long, B. (2010). Successful wolf hunt may not be profitable. Retrieved from http://www.idahoreporter.com/2010/successful-wolf-hunt-may-not-be-profitable/
Potential Wolf ControlActions in Lolo Zone. (2011-12). Retrieved from http://fishandgame.idaho.gov/public/docs/wolves/actionLoloZone.pdf
States Enact Record Number of Abortion Restrictions in First Half of 2011. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2011/07/13/index.html
Wedel, J., Shore, C., Feldman, G., & Lathrop, S. (2005, June 10). Toward an Anthropology of Public Policy. ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 600, 30-51. doi:10.1177/0002716205276734

Friday, February 24, 2012

Distributive justice --why does it matter?


Distributive equality encompasses philosophical concepts about the manner in which to best distribute “goods” so that every person has some degree of material security, without depriving others of such (Gosepath, 2011). While “simple equality” means everyone has the exact same amount, which is not possible, distributive equality takes into consideration individual choices and conditional permutations that would affect the amount any one person would have accessible (Gosepath, 2011). Hence, equal opportunity as a “prescriptive” form of equality grants every person a basic right to expect that he or she will not be restrained from attempting to obtain that which is possible, according to their individual capabilities; egalitarians also would see that “basic life conditions” would be granted, so that every person is able to take advantage of their opportunities (Gosepath, 2011). Whether or not a person is entitled to minimal goods and the security that entails, and the conditions under which this is to be apportioned by society, are issues that are explored by different perspectives of distributive equality.

In International Relations, theorists attempt to explain the growing incidence of intra state conflict by examining the absence of distributive equality and its consequences. Edward Azar (1991) explored the causes of   “protracted social conflict” (PSC), deeming that it results from “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation” ( as cited in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005, p. 84). This “deprivation of human needs” (p. 86) is at the core of ongoing conflicts such as between the Tamil and the Sinhalese of Sri Lanka, where one ethnic group has historically repressed and deprived another of their ability to function and flourish within the society (Sri Lanka Crisis History, 2011). The Sinhalese have maneuvered over the years to deprive the Tamil of political power, education, land and opportunity, until they provoked an insurrection (Sri Lanka Crisis History, 2011). This conflict has endured for more than two decades;  unfortunately,after it had supposedly been settled with international intervention, the Sinhalese leadership has reverted to behaviors that originally incited the violence (Sri Lanka Crisis History, 2011). 

Resolving such conflicts where a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ exists because one group has successfully seized power and is monopolizing resources is difficult. The United Nations cannot intervene in every conflict and enforce distributive equality; this must be a “prescriptive” norm, where the population integrates the concepts of equality and enforces them within their own societies. Because democratic governance is based upon these principles, one of the most successful approaches has been to assist nations in instituting democracy and gradually adopting the principles it enshrines. Education is the foundation; this is where my focus lies, in assisting developing nations create systems that allow every individual, male or female, regardless of ethnicity, achieve the ideal of equality and its consequent benefits. Distributive equality is critical for the resolution of protracted social conflicts, and education is at its core.

Gosepath, S. (2011, Spring ). Equality. Retrieved January 2012, from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edy/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/
Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2005). Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: Polity.
Sri Lanka Crisis History. (2011, January). Retrieved May 22, 2011, from Crisis Group: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/sri-lanka.aspx

Threats to Social Equity and Justice: New Challenges for Americans



Current economic conditions in the United States appear to be creating a social conditioning that is the antithesis of social equity, which Frederickson (2005) posited involves “justice, fairness, [and] equality,” especially in the realm of public policy (p.32).  As the recession continues to affect employment, and legislative bodies seek solutions to their budgetary problems, austerity measures increasingly target the poor and unemployed, calling into question the government’s allegiance to egalitarian and fairness principles.  In this essay, I will review the roles of justice and social equity in civil society and demonstrate how failure to endorse these threatens civil society and the democratic governance system of the United States.

Social Equity
Distributive justice and social equity are based upon a similar premise--that every individual is entitled to equal opportunities to access basic resources (food, shelter, safety), and that from this “level playing field,” they can determine their own degree of material success (Kranich, 2005; Frederickson, 2005; Lamont & Favor, 2008).  Concurrent with this simple foundational principle, are the “burdens” of society, meaning that while every individual may theoretically be entitled to essential equality, he or she is also expected to participate in the construct of contributing to the welfare of society as a whole(Lamont & Favor, 2008).  Hence, distributive justice becomes a balance of “give” and ‘take,” so that no individual is unduly burdened or profits excessively from the distribution of resources (Lamont & Favor, 2008). 

Social equity demands a more rigorous examination of social stratification, economic advantages, and historical inequities that contribute to an individual’s inability to access the same resources as his or her peers.  Frederickson (2005) and Kranich (2005) argued that equity demands an active participation in ensuring parity, even if it means allocating temporary privilege in order to ensure the disadvantaged can achieve it.   Frederickson (2005) expanded this concept to ensuring diversity in the workforce, and making sure public policies are equitable. 

Current legislative attempts to balance the budget by restricting access to such benefits as unemployment insurance and food stamps appear to violate the basic tenets of social equity and distributive justice.  HR3630, as amended, makes citizens who do not have a high school diploma or a GED ineligible to receive unemployment benefits, unless they enroll in and make satisfactory progress in remedial classes; it also enjoins that states require applicants to pass a drug test (Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 (Introduced in House - IH), 2011).  These measures can have the effect of removing the  neediest from eligibility rolls, endangering their ability to survive in an environment that is becoming increasingly difficult.  Receiving additional education is a laudable goal, but placing the additional financial burden on the poor to pay for the classes and materials, find child care and commute, in order to receive benefits they are legally entitled to, does not reflect social equity principles.

Justice
            Justice seen through the lens of virtue is ambiguous and subjective; Slote (2010) noted that while Aristotle, Plato and other rationalist philosophers posited that justice entailed deserving a fair portion of society’s good because of one’s virtuous behavior, defining virtue and what a fair portion consisted of, was difficult.  The concept of justice based upon universal love was a later development; it suggested that people should care about each other and because of this benevolence, should not behave toward others in a manner as to cause them harm (Slote, 2010).  Granting the validity of morality as a fundamental aspect of justice implies a degree of awareness of society’s moral principles and ethical imperatives.  This appears to make justice mutable and circumstantial, although modern western societies agree on most fundamental precepts of justice and ethics.

A recent development than can be considered a threat to justice as a moral principle is the Florida senate’s attempts at controlling food stamp use.  Senate bill 1658, if passed, would forbid food stamp recipients from using their benefits to purchase “non staple items,” including foods containing trans-fats, sweetened beverages, sweets, and salty snack foods (1658, 2012).  The concept of justice as a virtue includes that “the rightness of an action has to do with the inner state or motive that lies behind it” (Hume, 1739, as cited in Slote, 2010).  It seems dubious that this bill in any way reflects benevolence, but is instead an effort to limit choice for food stamp recipients, under the guise of saving taxpayer dollars.  As such, it fails to meet the standard of benevolence, respect, or community that justice emphasizes.

Conclusion
            Justice and social equity are social constructs based upon cultural norms and imperatives. In western democratic societies, social equity has been associated with the principle of distributive justice, ensuring that every individual has access to essential resources needed to survive; without this fundamental equality, the concept of equal opportunity becomes meaningless (Lamont & Favor, 2008).  Justice as a virtue enshrines ideals of caring and benevolence, and as such can be said to be subjective and circumstantial (Slote, 2010), except that without this sense of justice, involvement, and good will, social equity would be an intellectual exercise without much meaning. Both justice and equity are necessary for democracy to survive, as great disparities in wealth, opportunity, and privilege create an unbalanced social construct, and rob the majority of their ability to participate in governance. Restoring these to their central position would help restore balance in our system of government.
           


References
1658, 0-01432B-12 Florida Statutes §§ 402.82 (2012).
Frederickson, G. (2005, Winter). The State of Social Equity in American Public Administration. National Civic review, 94(4), 31-38.
Kranich, N. (2005). Equality and Equity of Access: What’s the Difference? Retrieved January 31, 2012, from http://www.ala.org/office/oif/iftoolkits/toolkitrelatedlinks/equalityequity
Lamont, J., & Favor, C. (2008). Distributive Justice. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 ed., ). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=justice-distributive
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 (Introduced in House - IH),  U.S.C. § 2122-2127 et seq. (Thomas 2011).
Slote, M. (2010). Justice as a Virtue. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 ed,, ). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/justice-virtue/

Saturday, February 18, 2012

Democracy: dying or simply in need of redefinition?


The Athenian principles of democratic governance—citizen participation in every aspect of policymaking, and holding the ultimate say in matters that affect their life and well being (Manville & Ober, 2003), appear to be the underlying ideals for most American citizens. Achieving these in a system as large and complex as the United States, however, requires constant reviews and the willingness to try new approaches, even if only experimentally.  This means trusting the stability and endurance of the concepts associated with democracy—governance by the people and for the people.  While many would assign such virtues as righteousness and integrity to these notions, others prefer a less sentimental approach to delineating the qualities of a system of governance, and examine the process from a pragmatic point of view (Ranney & Kendall, 1951).  Inherent in impartial inquiry is the act of challenging aspects of a system whose functionality is seen as incomplete, irrelevant, or flawed; resolving ambiguity about what democracy entails, forces one to  examine critiques, and use them to gain insights for improvements (Ranney & Kendall, 1951).  In this paper, I will outline two negative appraisals of the democratic process and evaluate their potential for creating both increased discourse and positive outcomes, or reducing options and thus hampering democratic processes.

Critiques of Democracy
Manville and Ober (2003) have delineated the ideal approach to democratic governance witnessed in ancient Athens, holding it as a model from which to derive an array of viable permutations.  The essential tenets were “participatory structures,” ‘communal values,” and “practices of engagement” that provided an environment within which the population, being a small concentration of citizens of like mind and background, were informed about issues, deliberated solutions, voted on their implementation, and were offered opportunities for leadership and individual influence (p.569).  In large democracies, many of these circumstances are unachievable, notably the uniformity found in small communities.  The first critique of democracy that appears valid, called “public choice theory,” asks whether it is possible to aggregate disparate interests to the point where final decisions satisfy the majority (Gilley, 2009).  In the realm of public policy, unelected officials make choices that may not be popular, and use a variety of tools to implement them (Schneider & Ingram, 1990).  In a general vote situation, where the public is asked to decide between a number of options, what has been termed the “Condorcet winner” principle might come into play; this means one selection might garner more votes, and thus be imposed, even if it does not have the support of the majority of voters(Gilley, 2009).  These examples appear to support the concept that democracy is at best a futile exercise in promoting a general sense of self-rule, but results in chaotic and unpredictable outcomes that might not suit the majority.

A counter-argument to this pessimistic outlook offers the permeable quality of democracy, in that it allows an infinite variety of cultural, ethnic, and societal backgrounds to co-exist, promising them the opportunity to create something of value to each one.  The principle of diversity as strength suggests that discourse is a central aspect of democracy.  Chambers (2009) argued that the missing ingredient today is the lack of such discourse; citizens do not gather, share information, or decide upon courses of action on policy that benefits them.  Hence, a shift in approaches might be called for, encouraging representatives to institute public forums as a matter of course, and use the resulting votes as the foundation for their policies, as opposed to imposing ideologically based policies and risking potential negative repercussions (Chambers, 2009).  Essentially, then, the critique that diversity is a weakness of democratic governance can be used as impetus for creating changes that make multiplicity a foundation for deliberation and real citizen participation in the policy making process.

A second argument against the efficiency of democracy is that of the public’s general ignorance and the fact that their inability to grasp complex international and national political realities makes them unsuited for self-governance (Gilley, 2009).  This perspective appears to favor rule by those who have access to wealth and privilege (Gilley, 2009) and to have existed even at the Constitution’s inception.  Beard (1912) described the manner in which many of the original authors attempted to institute a system that would protect their wealth and status from the “danger of the leveling spirit” of the “property-less masses.”   Alexander Hamilton is quoted as describing the majority as “the mass of the people who seldom judge or determine right,” and Madison, who feared “the tyranny of the majority,” as having foreseen with some accuracy a future where wealth would be ever more concentrated and a growing majority would have little( as cited in Beard, 1912).  The conflation of poverty, ignorance, and incompetence appears to be a common theme, and resolving these with societal restructuring dismissed.

Public education has been the preferred approach to resolving this issue and its influence upon populist governance.  Most democracies promote free basic education (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2010); in the United States, the federal government directs federal funding and supports individual states and localities, who then determine standards and outcomes they expect students to achieve(Department of Education, 2012).  The recent budget cuts aimed at educational programs puts in place a serious challenge to the principle of free education as foundational to democracy, though, and raise the specter of a return to power concentrated in the hands of a few.
 
Conclusion
            Idealized democracy portrays the citizen as the ultimate decision maker of his or her own fate, and well equipped intellectually, educationally, and socially, to create a civil society wherein the rights of individuals and the well-being of the community are absolutes (Manville & Ober, 2003).  Reality, though, consists of flawed human beings, many of whom are ignorant and poor, whose choices are unpredictable or so varied they cannot come to consensus, and who often do not understand their own role in the proper functioning of democratic governance (Gilley, 2009).  While many have used these negative attributes to suggest that democracy cannot function in such an environment, other options exist.  Societies as evolving systems are complex and diverse; as such, they offer numerous advantages, such as multifaceted approaches to problem solving, rich traditions to draw upon to create new paradigms, and the challenge of learning new forms of communication and synergistic functioning.  If societies invest in quality educational systems, and offer programs that provide citizens with universal standards and outcomes, they become well equipped to function in a complex democracy.  In essence, then, arguments that appear to cast aspersions upon the viability of democracy can be used to highlight solutions, and to shift from what might become a meritocratic system to one that truly respects the individual’s right to self determination.


References
Almond, G. A., Powell, Jr., G. B., Dalton, R. J., & Strom, K. (2010). Comparative Politics Today: A World View (9th ed.). New York, NY: Longman.
Beard, C. (1912). Framing the Constitution. In P. Woll (Ed.), American Government: Reading and Cases (11th ed.). Retrieved from http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/beard-charles_framing-the-constitution-1912.html
Chambers, S. (2009, June). Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy? Political Theory, 37(3), 323-350. doi: 10.1177/0090591709332336
Department of Education. (2012). What We Do. Retrieved from http://www2.ed.gov/about/what-we-do.html
Gilley, B. (2009, January). Is Democracy Possible? Journal of Democracy, 20(1), 113-127. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/docview/195557168?accountid=14872
Manville, B., & Ober, J. (2003). Beyond Empowerment: Building a Company of Citizens. In G. R. Hickman (Ed.), Leading Organizations: Perspectives for a New Era (Second ed., pp. 567-572). Los Angeles: Sage.
Ranney, A., & Kendall, W. (1951). Democracy: Confusion and Agreement. Political Research Quarterly, 4, 430-439. doi: 10.1177/106591295100400303
Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1990, May). Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools. Journal of Politics, 52, 510-529. doi: 10.2307/2131904

Thursday, February 16, 2012

Top-down business practices vs democratic workplaces--which is better?


Democracy, according to classical principles, raises the concept of individual from that of a subset of a group, to a recognized actor whose input is critical to the group’s functioning (Manville & Ober, 2003).  Inherent in this definition are the notions of collective action and mutuality, implying trust and respect, as well as a sense of responsibility toward the collective (Manville & Ober, 2003).  Juxtaposed to these ideals is the recognition of the significance of diversity, manifested not only as individual differences but also as the aggregate of  unique entities whose collaborative efforts can represent a more holistic approach to problem solving that that offered by a hierarchical structure (Levine, 2003).  While these definitional aspects represent an idealized set, they can be useful in establishing a basic set of norms for bringing democratic practices into the workplace.  Diversity as a construct within which individual abilities and talents are recognized and valued, leads to a couple of democratic principles as logical extensions. The first is self-determination, meaning that individuals are encouraged to develop their unique qualities and talents within the organizational structure; the next is participation in the decision-making.  In this essay, I will define individuality and collective action as democratic principles and explain how they are synergistic components of diversity in the workplace.
Self-determination and collective action     
            The concept of self determination includes not only autonomy and the right to choose, but includes in a democracy implications of “authorship of decisions” that influence one’s environment and a sense that one’s ideas are regarded as significant-- and one’s participation is important as well(Post, 2005).  In an organization that values diversity, individuals are encouraged to participate in the decisions that shape their ability to function within the organization; Gratton (2005) has described this as engaging in a mutually respectful relationship with the organization wherein an individual’s right to participate in the definition of the relationship is recognized (p. 577).
            Collective action is the other facet of a diverse organization and involves what Manville and Ober (2003) have described as a democratic “practice of process,” that is, deliberately creating an environment within which individuals gather and deliberate decisions, offering their solutions with the expectation that they will be considered as viable alternatives.  This can only occur in an environment that encourages transparency and accountability; group members are allowed full access to relevant information, including the manner in which final decisions are reached, and hold themselves and each other accountable for full participation and maintaining high personal and ethical standards in the process (Manville & Ober, 2003).
            Both autonomy and collective action as democratic principles function best within an environment that recognizes the importance of diversity and the multiplicity of perspectives it offers. Intrinsic to this, though, is the assumption of a set of shared values, of mutual trust and desire to reach objectives that are significant to the group as a whole (Gratton, 2005; Manville & Ober, 2003). Hence, individuality and collective action are synergistic and central aspects of democracy.
Conclusion
            Diversity in the workplace can be more than recognition of the aggregate of individuals that populate it.  First is the recognition of the unique perspectives brought by each individual and the concept that this uniqueness is intrinsic to democratic functionality.  One can construct, therefore, a model of diversity in the workplace as appreciation of the multiplicity of perspectives.  Furthermore, this model would necessitate honoring the autonomy and self-determination of individuals.  Finally, it would mean creating an environment where this diverse collection of autonomous individuals can express their opinions and deliberate, within a transparent and mutually enforcing environment, so that decisions reached benefit the collective. Implicit within this ideal are personal and group accountability, as well as agreed upon ethical standards and norms. These tenets promote democratic workplaces, an ideal that some feel is a logical development in the near future.



Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Bureaucratic ethics and democracy--what happened?


The role of government is multifaceted; its purview includes maintaining public safety, funding and directing education, regulating commerce and protecting the nation from foreign aggression (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2010).   Various agencies are charged with writing and enforcing government policies, providing the means for achieving established objectives; bureaucracies are intermediaries between the government and the people, performing such functions as distributing information and benefits, and enforcing laws and regulations (Almond et al., 2010).  These functions are relatively general, but their performance and outcomes reflect the priorities and paradigms of the state and citizenry; hence, communist bureaucrats will enforce party priorities, while those operating within a democracy are expected to reflect the principles of democratic governance.  This paper will examine the relationship between democratic governance and bureaucratic ethics, to determine whether democratic principles provide an ethical foundation for public agencies, and whether this ideal is carried through in bureaucratic functioning.
Bureaucratic ethics
            Ethics have been defined as ideals that guide moral decisions, are based upon religious or societal norms, and generally include such fundamental premises as justice, respect for the rights of others, veracity, and awareness of the consequences of one’s actions upon others (Cooper, 2006).  Bureaucrats, as public servants, must conform to ethical guidelines established by the agencies they work for; their behavior must reflect understanding of the democratic underpinnings of their roles as unelected officials and government representatives (Rohr, 1989).  Inasmuch as bureaucrats are given considerable discretionary power and are not subject to “popular control” (p.4), they have a significant responsibility to adhere to democratic principles as they perform their duties (Rohr, 1989).  Bureaucratic ethics in a democracy, then, entail using established and personal ethical guidelines, to provide government services based upon respect for civil rights under the constitution.
Theory versus reality
            The ideal that democratic ideals serve as the template for bureaucratic ethics, while assumed true, is not necessarily carried through in life.  In education, violations of this principle occur regularly; a recent case is a good case in point.  The Arizona Superintendent of Schools of late ordered all ethnic studies courses in the state cancelled, after the state legislature, at his urging, passed an act making them illegal (Medrano, 2010).  These courses have been a popular offering and have demonstrably helped minority students in raising overall achievement scores.  Districts have asked for a reversal of the ruling but have been advised that they will be penalized should they continue to offer the courses (Medrano, 2010).  This unilateral decision violates the democratic principle of self-determination, inasmuch as the districts, students, and families petitioned the state to keep the courses. The Superintendent’s role as a bureaucrat is to support student efforts for academic success, and create a learning environment within the state that supports student autonomy, critical thinking, and self-direction. Instead, Arizona has become a forum for one person’s views, imposed upon the majority.
Conclusion
            Bureaucrats function as unelected officials whose role it is to provide a government with practical means for achieving its goals and objectives. In a democracy, bureaucrats must understand and uphold the democratic principles of the system, and incorporate these into their code of ethics. Included in such are upholding the Bill of Rights and ensuring that all actions taken meet Constitutional standards.  While this is an ideal, it is frequently violated, demonstrating that bureaucrats either do not understand their role as extensions of the government and of a democratic system, or are indifferent to its ethical standards and willing to infringe upon the rights of the people they serve until held accountable.
           
           



References
Almond, G. A., Powell, Jr., G. B., Dalton, R. J., & Strom, K. (2010). Comparative Politics Today: A World View (9th ed.). New York, NY: Longman.
Cooper, T. L. (2006). The Responsible Administrator: An Approach to Ethics for the Administrative Role (5th ed.). San Francisco, CA. Jossey-Bass.
Medrano, L. (2010, December 31). Ethnic studies classes illegal in Arizona public schools as of Jan. 1. The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2010/1231/Ethnic-studies-classes-illegal-in-Arizona-public-schools-as-of-Jan.-1
Rohr, J. A. (1989). Ethics for Bureaucrats: An Essay on Law and values (2nd ed.) [Google Books]. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rEJsMUMoR1cC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=bureaucratic+ethics+democratic+OR+governance&ots=h2WLL0rqUK&sig=9xld7wQ-cWZQWOeGDJQ4cJ1-Ikg#v=onepage&q=bureaucratic%20ethics%20democratic%20OR%20governance&f=false

Thursday, February 2, 2012

Enlisting citizen participation in environmental policy implementation



            When policies are implemented, enlisting citizen cooperation and participation involves choosing from a number of strategies and policy tools, based upon the objectives and target population (Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Environmental protection as a concept is subject to personal interpretation and as such does not hold the same imperative for every individual. The severity of the problem and potential effects on communities can influence the choice of policy instruments; risk assessments are used to determine urgency, localization and possible long term ramifications of environmental issues (Hetes, 2007). Creating a meaningful, effective environmental policy entails not only using a hierarchical enforcement course of action, but also putting in place a participatory process that invites willing collaboration. If the objective is to avoid the use of regulatory and coercive instruments, a first step would be to analyze the cost to benefit ratio to both market interests and the public, and develop approaches that take these into consideration. This paper will examine two common policy tools used in environmental policy and determine their efficacy, taking into consideration contextual constraints that might limit their usefulness.
Policy Tools
            While environmental laws have had a positive overall impact on water and air quality in the United States, realizing a high degree of compliance has meant utilizing a variety of policy tools, basing the approach on a  number of factors, including regional and financial, as well as private and commercial interests("Basics of Regulatory," 2011). In the United States, environmental legislation is created in stages; after Congress has written the law, its implementation is delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which then establishes regulations detailing the intent of the law and enforcement strategies ("Basics of Regulatory," 2011).
            To avoid a regulatory approach to enforcement, policy makers must address the issue of voluntary acquiescence, and determine the most likely tool to elicit this response.  Schneider & Ingram (1990) have argued that motivating individuals to comply with regulations involves understanding their implicit assumptions about the value of the desired outcomes on their personal lives, and using that self interest to create incentives that will help them overcome their natural reluctance to extend themselves beyond their usual behaviors.  In addition to overcoming hesitation based upon unfamiliarity, policy tools can assist individuals (and businesses) develop the necessary environment to facilitate compliance (Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Incentive and capacity building tools have the advantage of being adjustable (Schneider & Ingram, 1990).
Incentive Tools
            Incentive tools are designed to elicit decisions that entail the dual benefit of policy compliance and tangible rewards for doing so (Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Tax credits for individuals and businesses for insulating and installing renewable energy sources exist to some degree in many states ("Energy Efficiency," 2011).  The primary benefit of this approach is that individuals who intended to invest in these additions to their properties receive a reward, which might be a catalyst for this choice. On the other hand, the tax credit is relatively small, is subject to changes due to economic and priority shifts, and is an “after the fact” instrument. This limits its value as a policy instrument, if widespread change is desired.
Capacity Tools
            Capacity tools take a proactive approach by providing information about the problem being addressed and offering researched solutions to these, thus enabling a more informed decision making process(Schneider & Ingram, 1990). In addition to these introductory aspects, capacity tools assist individuals create the desired outcome, by providing financial resources to encourage active participation in the transformation process (Schneider & Ingram, 1990).  As an example, federal and state agencies offer a number of financial options, such as grants and subsidies, for converting homes and businesses into energy efficient buildings (Green Building, 2010). Sandfort, Coleman & Sowa(2008) caution that publicly funded instruments can distance citizens from personal responsibility and shape attitudes towards unrealistic expectations. Utilitarian analysis tools would clarify whether the potential detrimental effects on civic responsibility would be worth the risk—in other words, are the environmental benefits enough to offset possible citizen apathy or hesitancy? As climate change worsens and environmental conditions worsen, policymakers will be forced to address this question more frequently.
Conclusion
            Environmental legislation attempts to establish parameters within which individuals and businesses can function while protecting essential resources such as water and air. When composing environmental policy, if the desired outcome is a non-regulatory approach that will incentivize citizen participation, the most effective course would be to include incentives and capacity building tools. Democratic ideals include self determination and autonomy, while collectively working toward a state where all have equal rights and opportunities. Incentive tools meet this ideal, as they encourage personal responsibility and reward those who have the means to take action(Schneider & Ingram, 1990). These instruments are, however, of limited usefulness because current tax incentives are small, and they rely upon individual ability and willingness to take action.
            Capacity building instruments are also pluralistic in this setting, as they offer citizens the information needed to determine a course of action, and assist in developing the desired environment (Schneider & Ingram, 1990).  Their reliance upon government funding, in this context, can be problematic, as they can create a reverse incentive by encouraging citizen dependency (Sandfort, Selden, & Sowa, 2008).  One can conclude that pluralistic tools depend upon voluntary participation, and as such might have limited usefulness in a society that might not prioritize environmental protection, nor understand the consequences of ignoring its imperatives.


             



References
Energy Efficiency Home and Vehicle Tax Credits. (2011). Retrieved from http://ase.org/taxcredit#home_improvement_11
Green Building. (2010). http://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/tools/funding.htm#national
Hetes, R. G. (2007, Fall). Science, risk, and risk assessment and their role(s) supporting environmental risk management. Environmental Law, 37(4) Retrieved from http://go.galegroup.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA174283038&v=2.1&u=minn4020&it=r&p=EAIM&sw=w
Sandfort, J., Selden, S. C., & Sowa, J. E. (2008, January 7). Do Government Tools Influence Organizational Performance?: Examining Their Implementation in Early Childhood Education. The American Review of Public Administration, 38(4), 412-438. doi: 10.1177/0275074007310488
Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1990, May). Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools. Journal of Politics, 52, 510-529. doi: 10.2307/2131904
The Basics of the Regulatory Process. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/basics.html

Monday, January 30, 2012

Some thoughts on Islamic Traditions



The word “tradition” is generally used to describe a set of values or customs that is passed on for a number of generations, and honored specifically because of its endurance. In Islam, the term is used ubiquitously and appears to have several meanings, including a movement based on a return to pure Islamic values, such as Wahhabism (Lewis 2004, 120) or “authoritarian and quietist” versus “radical and activist” traditions (Lewis 2004, 10). An alternate meaning refers to the “sayings and acts attributed to Muhammad and transmitted orally” (Webster's New World College Dictionary 2002, 1517). After Muhammad’s death, a number of stories, or traditions (hadith) ascribed to the prophet were compiled and used to interpret his intent, so as to guide the Muslim community in understanding  his standards and expectations (Berkey 2003, 116). As time passed, these traditions have taken on a life of their own, in that their meanings, reliability and relative strength or weakness have been the focus of ongoing debate and study. Just as “Islamic Traditions” as a term has different connotations, the hadith are stratified according to their authenticity and content, adding incredible complexity to the issue. As it appears impossible to establish any truly stringent guidelines for their legitimacy and reliability, it would seem that basing a movement upon the guidance of hadith would be a dubious venture based more on faith than scriptural authenticity.

Hadith have generally been categorized as belonging to one of at least four categories:  Sahih (sound), Hasan (good), Da’if (weak), or Maudu’ (fabrications) (An Introduction to the Science of Hadith 2010).  The Sahih hadith are considered authoritative in that they came from trustworthy sources; Hasan hadith have some reliability issues, perhaps due to being second hand stories, but their sources are yet considered dependable (An Introduction to the Science of Hadith 2010). The last two categories are reserved for those traditions whose veracity is in doubt, due to several factors including “political differences, factions based on issues of creed...fabrications by story-tellers or ignorant ascetics, prejudice in favor of a particular imam, personal motives or proverbs turned into hadiths...” (An Introduction to the Science of Hadith 2010). The task of reviewing and certifying the reliability of hadith, as well as publishing the collections of those considered Shahih or Hasan, has been the focus of  scholars since the 9th century (Berkey 2003).

Content criticism of the hadith as an early scholarly discipline has been a source of speculation. Western scholars had assumed that early studies were focused on their genealogy with little attention paid to the content, and that the innate faith of the Muslim was such that they were more intent on preserving the linearity of transmission than in critically examining the substance within (Brown 2008). There is a growing belief however that early hadith scholars did indeed analyze content and reject those which did not agree with predetermined criteria including whether or not the report contradicted the Qu’ran, established sunna or the “verdict of reason,” that is, whether or not an event could have occurred historically (Brown 2008, 152).  In his  review of  Mohammad Kamali’s work A Textbook of Hadith Studies: Authenticity, Compilation, Classification and Criticism of Hadith (2005), Gavin Picken (2006) comments that although the noted scholar feels that the study and review of hadith has indeed been completed over the centuries and is now redundant, there are “neo-traditionalists” who would revive this practice inasmuch as they feel that pure knowledge can only be achieved in this “classical way” (Picken 2006, 132). This idea is similar to that of  many evangelical Christians, who insist that a literal interpretation of the Bible is the only way to achieve a true understanding of God’s intent.

It appears that “Islamic Traditions” is a fluid term with a number of connotations; it evolves and mutates depending upon the person or group using it and cannot be firmly attributed to any one specific item, agenda or story. Those movements that wish to return to what they deem to be ‘pure” Islam are constricted by the indeterminate source of the hadith they use as foundational principles. If however they rely upon the determination of their Imam, they are taking a leap of faith that he indeed is an infallible source. Either way, there does not appear to be any firmly rooted absolutism in the minds of the scholars; the community itself, however, not having the background of the  ulama, has to rely upon them for interpretation and verification of authenticity. That also can be seen as a leap of faith.

 

"An Introduction to the Science of Hadith." Islamic Awareness. October 2010. http://www.islamic-awareness.org/Hadith/Ulum/asb7.html (accessed October 21, 2010).
Berkey, Jonathan. The Formation of Islam. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Brown, Jonathan. "How We Know early Hadith Critics Did Matn Criticism and Why It's So Hard to Find." Islamic Law and Society 15, 2008: 143-184.
Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam. New York: Random House, 2004.
Picken, Gavin. Review of “A Textbook of Hadith Studies by Mohammad Kamali." Journal of Qu'ranic Studies, Vol. 8 No 6, 2006: 131-38.
Webster's New World College Dictionary. Cleveland: Wiley Publishing Inc., 2002.

Thursday, January 26, 2012

Depriving citizens of their vote: New maneuvers, old strategy




The right to vote is a normative founding principle of a democracy; it is implicitly understood that government by the people entails public participation in the policy making process. Voter turnout fluctuates the United States, but has been averaged to 52%, much lower than most European democracies (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2006). The reason for this low turnout has been debated; some have posited that the percentage is based on census numbers of people of voting age, without consideration for the number of illegal immigrants or convicted felons, who are disenfranchised in many states (Almond, Powell, Dalton, & Strom, 2006). Recent developments might curtail this number even more, as states deliberately seek ways to eliminate voters from the rolls and skew election results by depriving certain groups of their vote. This reminds us of the early 20th century, when women fought to get the vote, and were pushed back by those who did not want their monopoly on power threatened.

Some of the measures being implemented with the direct intent of disenfranchising voters include restricting early voting and absentee ballots, in order to force voters to show up at the polls in person and present a photo ID. One example of this is HB 194 of Ohio, which would disallow counties from mailing absentee ballots to residents, halve the number of days allowable for early voting, and eliminates online registration (Voting Rights, 2011).

A number of states have passed photo ID laws, most of which will take effect before the 2012 elections (Voter Identification Requirements, 2012). “Strict” photo ID states require voters to present a photo ID when they come to vote; if they do not have one with them, they can use a ‘provisional” ballot that is invalidated if they do not return within a set number of days with the acceptable identification. Other photo ID states allow the person to vote if he or she can prove in some other way that they are who they claim to be (such as signing an affidavit) (Voter Identification Requirements, 2012). A number of the strict photo ID laws have been challenged in court because they appear to target the poor, students and minority populations, all of whom are more likely to not have acceptable forms of photo ID (Voter Identification Requirements, 2012).

These attempted legal restrictions on voter’s rights have been implemented in most “battleground” states, where preventing large demographics from voting could determine the presidential election (Dade, 2012). The purported reason for these tactics is to “reduce voter fraud” (Dade, 2012), which, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, is very rare; because it can disenfranchise up to 10% of eligible voters, it should be carefully evaluated before implemented as a ‘remedy” for a non-existent threat ( Policy Brief on the Truth About “Voter Fraud”, 2006).

While the Constitution of the United States does not guarantee the right to vote, it does emphasize that no state shall deprive a citizen of their voting rights. The normative principle of a democracy upon which the Constitution rests is centered on the concepts of populism, self determination and government by the people. Infringing upon these is a violation of this principle and a very real threat to the legitimacy of future elections, and of the resulting governments.


Sources:
Policy Brief on the Truth About “Voter Fraud”. (2006). Retrieved from The Brennan Cneter for Justice: http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/policy_brief_on_the_truth_about_voter_fraud/
Almond, G., Powell, B., Dalton, R., & Strom, K. (2006). Comparative Politics Today. New York: Longman.
Dade, C. (2012, January 12). Political Battle Brewing Over New Voter ID Laws. Retrieved January 24, 2012, from NPR: http://www.npr.org/2012/01/11/145044060/political-battle-brewing-over-new-voter-id-laws
Voter Identification Requirements. (2012, January 9). Retrieved from National Conference of State Legislatures: http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections-campaigns/voter-id-state-requirements.aspx
Voting Rights. (2011, December 19). Retrieved January 23, 2012, from ACLU: http://www.acluohio.org/issues/votingrights/