“Cossack! Do not sleep. In
the gloomy dark the Chechen roams beyond the river...”
(Aleksander Pushkin, 1820)
The end of the
Cold War and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring universal
peace. Instead, small states and outlaying regions incorporated into the
monolithic USSR, realizing an opportunity to attain a long-sought autonomy,
pressed for independence and established their own states. The splintering did
not end there, however; many of these newly self-governing entities were soon
confronted with secessionist bids of their own, generally from ethnic groups
seeking self rule, in many cases due to oppression suffered at the hands of
majority ethnic groups whose grip on power and economic advantages did not
loosen after the demise of the Soviet state. Georgia is one of these last,
trying to maintain its hold on two breakaway provinces; Chechnya is a region
struggling to free itself from Russia’s long held imperial clutch, while
Azerbaijan fights with Armenia over territory each would like to claim. In
every case, the underlying paradigm appears to be fervor to preserve the
nation-state as the sole legitimate entity, opposed by a new outlook, which
demands equality regardless of minority status, and the opportunity to develop
a different type of community, wherein culture and ethnicity are celebrated and
member are allowed complete autonomy. As of right now, this dichotomous set of
ideas has led to violence and brutal attempts to suppress any threats to the
status quo.
Georgia
After the breakup
of the Soviet Union in 1991, the southwestern states of Chechnya, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan were among those calling for independence (CIS, 2011). Many
newly self-governing states created the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). Although Russia supported this move, and ratified a treaty with
them, it never lost the desire to maintain close political and economic ties,
presumably because of their strategic location. Russia has been steadily
working towards re-integrating these states into its sphere of influence by
manipulating the “post independence instability” (CIS, 2011) within many
of these republics by posting troops along its southern border; it hopes to
convince the UN and CSCE that their military presence in the region is
legitimate (CIS, 2011). A number of states within CIS have cooperated in a
move to create closer economic and military ties with Russia; Georgia, however,
has carefully sidestepped any attempts to maneuver it into this agreement and
in 2008 withdrew completely, instead opting for a rapprochement with Europe and
the United States and requesting to be granted membership in NATO, to safeguard
it against Russian threats (CIS, 2011). NATO’s consideration of this
application made the Russians very nervous and is thought to have inspired
their heavy-handed interference in Georgia’s struggle with its breakaway
province of South Ossetia (Bloomfield, 2008).
South Ossetia was the focus of international attention in 2008 when Georgia
attacked secessionist rebels and consequently was confronted by invading
Russian troops occupying South Ossetia, ostensibly to protect ethnic Russians
living there (Bloomfield, 2008). Even though it was now fighting Russian
troops and not just rebel forces, Georgia would not agree to uphold a
cease-fire, provoking an all-out attack from Russia. Both nations finally
agreed to an US and EU brokered agreement but accused each other of ethnic cleansing
and genocide (Booth, 2008). Russia now occupies South Ossetia and the
neighboring region of Abkhazia, ostensibly to protect their
independence (Booth, 2008) . Georgia broke diplomatic relations with
Russia after the incident, but in a very recent development, has agreed to talk
with Russia about allowing it to join the WTO, which it had resisted because of
the ongoing disagreement over Ossetia (Washington calls on Georgia to
allow Russian WTO entry - Biden, 2011). In a more ominous move, however, Georgia
has been courting the United States in a bid to purchase sophisticated
weaponry; an indication that it has no real intention of granting Russia a
prolonged occupation of territories it considers Georgian (Spiegel, 2009).
Chechnya
The lands that
border Russia to the south, in the Caucasus region, are Russia’s hotbed of
terrorism. Recent estimates calculate that 80% of all terrorist attacks occur
in the north Caucasus region, up 60% in 2009 from the previous year (King
& Menon, 2011). It seems that there are no victims too innocent for these
attacks—in Russia in 2004, a school full of children were targeted, killing
300; two years earlier, a theater hostage-taking episode took the lives of
170 theater-goers, and numerous other incidents have killed train as well as
airline passengers (King & Menon, 2011). As usual, the response has
been heavy handed and violent, leading to a cycle of escalation, with no end or
resolution in sight.
Historically,
Chechnya has been a Russia’s difficult child. During their 19th
century imperialistic expansionary period, Russia occupied the Caucasus
Mountains in an effort to contain the Ottoman and Persian empires (King
& Menon, 2011). Ruling Chechnya was a particularly thorny issue; in other
regions, the strategy had been to appoint well-known local elites, whose
loyalty was not in doubt, to rule the new provinces (King & Menon,
2011). However, Chechnya is mountainous and rugged and difficult to access, so
Russia had to resort to picking native elites to rule, resulting in numerous
rebellions and constant fighting to maintain some stability in the
region (King & Menon, 2011). This was the beginning of a system of
brutal repression culminating in Stalin’s deportation of nearly half a million
inhabitants to Central Asia (allegedly for collaborating with the Nazis); when
they returned after the war it was imbued with a sense of injustice and what
has been described as a “narrative of historical oppression” (King &
Menon, 2011). In 1994, when Chechnya demanded it be granted independence from
Russia, Boris Yeltsin attacked with overwhelming force, resulting in heavy
casualties; in 1996, he negotiated a cease-fire, which granted some degree of
autonomy but not the requested independence (King & Menon, 2011).
Since then, Putin has also launched offensives against Chechnya, this time to
suppress the terrorism erupting from the region (King & Menon, 2011).
Chechnya has also
struggled with high-level corruption; although Russia has invested in economic
development in the region, it appears that large portions are siphoned off,
resulting in ongoing poverty and resentment (King & Menon, 2011).
Islam, therefore, has experienced resurgence as a message of hope for the
oppressed, along with nationalistic fervor and a determination to resist the
Russian military occupation (King & Menon, 2011). In addition to these
factors, though, is a sense of ambiguity—Chechnya is neither Russian nor
independent, a conundrum it cannot resolve with terrorism. The question that
needs to be answered is, whether granting every ethnic group autonomy will
weaken the sense of community enjoyed within a nation state, or strengthen the
bonds of civil society as each group fulfills what it perceives as its own
potential. Russia has answered in the negative. It remains to be seen whether
it can maintain its hold on this small breakaway state.
Azerbaijan
The conflict in
Azerbaijan revolves around a small region within its borders occupied by ethnic
Armenians (Nagorno Karabakh), who seek to either become part of neighboring
Armenia or an independent state (Migdalovitz, 2003). After the breakup of
the Soviet Union, this territorial tug of war exploded, resulting in heavy
losses and over a million refugees (Migdalovitz, 2003). There have been
numerous international interventions, but until the two states resolve the
issue of whom Nagorno Karabakh legitimately belongs to, or whether they can
agree to grant it self-rule, a resolution seems distant.
The
Armenian perspective is that Azerbaijan in all likelihood intends to oust the
ethnic Armenians from Karabakh and they must be protected (Migdalovitz,
2003). They have refused to recognize Karabakh’s declaration of independence
from Azerbaijan, due to fears that doing so might provoke Azerbaijan into
declaring war, assisted by its ally Turkey (Migdalovitz, 2003). It has
been supplying arms, food, supplies, and funds to Karabakh to support the
insurgency (Migdalovitz, 2003). In 2001 the Armenian parliament issued a
list of conditions for stopping the confrontation with Azerbaijan; these
include “unification of Karabakh with Armenia or an international confirmation
of its independent status, the participation of Karabakh authorities in
drafting the final settlement, a sufficient common border of Armenia and
Karabakh that would guarantee the security of Karabakh, and the fixing of a
border with Azerbaijan” (Migdalovitz, 2003, p. 12).
The Azeri view is that granting autonomy to Karabakh would be opening the door
Armenian efforts to eventually laying claim to other Azeri
regions (Migdalovitz, 2003). They claim that Armenia has interfered in its
internal affairs and that it will not deal with any self proclaimed Karabakhi
government; if Armenia were to recognize this last, it would consider that a
declaration of war (Migdalovitz, 2003). They might be willing to consider
giving Karabakh” more rights, but not independence” (Migdalovitz, 2003, p.
14).
What we can make of these examples
In every case, the conflict centers around a desire for self-rule, generally
based on ethnic differentiation. In Georgia’s case, after achieving its
independence, it refused to grant the same to South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
initiating a war of suppression that eventually backfired when Russia stepped
in. Chechnya is seeking release from Russia’s long held imperial grip and has
exported its terrorism to Moscow, where it can have maximum impact. Armenia and
Azerbaijan are struggling over control of a small province within Azerbaijan, using
the people of Karabakh as collateral in their determination to prove the
ascendancy of the nation -state over the claims of an ethnic group seeking
self-determination or to be rejoined with their peers.
Russia’s intervention in Georgia’s conflict can be seen as a form of “coercive
commitment” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004), in that they are dedicated to
continuing their presence in South Ossetia until Georgia grants it
independence, ostensibly to protect the ethnic Russians residing there.
The Georgians can “blame” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) Russia for
escalating the conflict as it interfered knowing full well that this would
precipitate a crisis. Georgia’s ongoing sanctions against Russia are a
manifestation of its continuing sense of outrage. The Chechens are using
“instrumental violence” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) to punish Russia for
refusing to grant them independence and continuing to support the oppressive
corrupt regime they installed. In many ways, their actions can be seen as
“image threats,” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) since the very act of penetrating
deep into the Russian homeland to commit acts of terrorism threatens Russia’s
sense of security and its status as a power that can effectively deter threats
against it. Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to be caught up in a form of
“tit for tat” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004), each determined to claim control
over the Karabakh region. They have “hostile attitudes and
perceptions” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004) of each other, inflamed by grudges
they still hold about injustices committed against them by Russia in the past,
and assumptions they currently have about each other’s intentions.
The three conflicts are based upon a Westphalian concept of nation-state
sovereignty and the refusal to grant autonomy to ethnic groups, perhaps due to
fear of losing that central governing structure upon which the model is based.
Each state, whether large or small, has allowed some degree of
splintering—Georgia and Azerbaijan were granted independence after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, but then set up a stiff resistance to
demands for further reductions in the size and number of autonomous regions.
Until these centuries’ old paradigms are shifted, it seems likely that the
struggles for self-determination will continue, because as each group is
allowed some autonomy, others, seeing this, begin to clamor for their own. We
are, in effect, witnessing the beginning of the end of this Westphalian model.
Bloomfield, A. (2008, August
8). Georgia:Russia enters war in South Ossetia. Retrieved May 10, 2011,
from The telegraph:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2525400/Georgia-Russia-enters-into-war-in-South-Ossetia.html
Booth, J. (2008, August 12). Georgia
Timeline: How Crisis Unfolded. Retrieved May 10, 2011, from The Sunday
Times: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4514939.ece
CIS. (2011). Retrieved May 10,
2011, from Global Security:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/cis.htm
King, C., & Menon, R.
(2011). Prisoners of the Caucasus: Russia's Invisible Civil War. Foreign
Affairs , 20-34.
Migdalovitz, C. (2003). Armenia-Azerbaijan
Conflict. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service.
Pruitt, D., & Kim, S. H.
(2004). Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. Boston:
McGraw Hill.
Spiegel, P. (2009, July 24). Wall
Street Journal ,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124835911309475853.html.
Washington calls on Georgia
to allow Russian WTO entry - Biden. (2011, March 10). Retrieved May 10, 2011, from RIANOVOSTI:
http://en.rian.ru/world/20110310/162941235.html
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